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Abstract:  
We use data from several waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances to document credit and 
debit card ownership and use across US demographic groups. We then present recent theoretical 
and empirical contributions to the study of credit and debit card behavior. Utilization rates of 
credit lines and portfolios of card holders present several puzzles. Credit line increases initiated by 
banks lead households to restore previous utilization rates. High-interest credit card debt co-exists 
with substantial holdings of low-interest liquid assets and with accumulation of retirement assets. 
Although available evidence disputes ignorance of credit card terms by card holders, credit card 
rates do not respond to competition. There is a rising trend in bankruptcy and delinquency, partly 
attributable to an increased tendency of households to declare bankruptcy associated with reduced 
social stigma, ease of procedures, and financial incentives. Co-existence of credit card debt with 
retirement assets can be explained through self-control hyperbolic discounting. Strategic default 
motives contribute partly to observed co-existence of credit card debt with low-interest liquid 
assets. A framework of “accountant-shopper” households, in which a rational accountant tries to 
control an impulsive shopper, seems consistent with both types of co-existence and with observed 
utilization of credit lines. 
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1.  Introduction 
Access to consumer credit in the form of a credit card has grown rapidly to 
become one of the most frequently held financial instruments by households in the 
United States. Credit cards offer the convenience of cashless transactions and also 
allow for purchases over the telephone and, increasingly, via the internet. Credit cards 
also offer consumers the flexibility of deferring payment to a future date, and thus can 
allow consumers to smooth spending over temporary liquidity shortfalls. However, 
invoking a credit card’s revolving credit option typically results in paying high rates 
of interest not only on the existing balance but also on any new charges made on the 
card as well, and thus is a fairly costly form of credit, especially if the revolving credit 
feature is used frequently. 
This Paper  documents features of credit card and debit card ownership and 
use, over time and across demographic groups in the U.S. population, using data from 
several waves of a high-quality and detailed survey of finances of U.S. households: 
the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). We consider 
household responses from the SCF to questions about access to and attitudes towards 
credit and debit cards and explore portfolios of households with and without credit 
card balances.  
Our analysis of the data, presented in Sections 2-9, illustrates several puzzling 
features of credit card usage by US households. In Sections 10 and 11 we discuss 
recent theories of consumer behavior that may explain some of those puzzles. These 
include the choice to borrow at high rates of interest; the interplay between spending 
control problems, credit card borrowing, and personal bankruptcy filing; and the 
coexistence of credit card debt with considerable levels of liquid and retirement assets. 
We also explore the growing popularity of debit cards as either a supplement to or an 
alternative to credit card use. We offer concluding remarks in Section 12. 
 
2.  Card ownership over time 
Our primary source of information on the spread of credit and debit card use 
among U.S. households is from several waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances. 
The SCF has been conducted triennially since 1983, and recent waves have each 3 
consisted of about 3,000 households drawn from a standard representative sample, 
supplemented with about 1,500 high-wealth households selected on the basis of tax 
records. Sample weights are provided to make the data representative of the U.S. 
population as a whole. Each wave of the SCF provides detailed information on 
household-level holdings of a variety of financial assets as well as sources, terms, and 
uses of a wide range of consumer credit options, including credit cards. Data are also 
collected on household characteristics including age, education, family structure, race, 
and income. Finally, the SCF also asks a number of questions on attitudes towards 
consumer borrowing, reasons for saving, and investment decisions.
1 
In 1983, 65 percent of U.S. households had a credit card of some kind, 
including store-specific cards and gas cards (Table 1, column 1). Only 43 percent of 
households had a bank-type credit card such as a Visa or Mastercard (column 2); that 
is, a card that is accepted at a broad range of retail establishments, and after making a 
minimum required payment allows the consumer to revolve the balance if so desired. 
By 1992, 62 percent of the U.S. population had a bank-type credit card, and by 2001 
that percentage had risen to almost 73. Over the same period, the percentage of 
households with any type of credit card increased much less, and in 2001 that 
percentage was 76 percent, only slightly higher than the percentage with a bank-type 
card. There has also been an increase in the number of bank-type credit cards owned 
per household: in 1983, households with a bank-type card typically held only one 
such type card. By 2001, one-third of card-holding households still had only one 
bank-type card, one-third had two, and about one-fourth had three or four. A little 
more than 7 percent had five or more. 
Opening of credit card accounts, either for the first time or as accounts in 
addition to pre-existing ones, is much more common than other changes in household 
portfolios (e.g., those associated with stockholding). Another source of data, the 
January 2001 Consumer Survey on Credit Cards, shows that about 20 percent of 
bank-type credit card holders had obtained one or more new accounts during the 
previous year, and most of these were additional or replacement accounts. According 
to the survey, 41 percent of holders held three or more bank-type credit card accounts 
(Durkin, 2002). In the remainder of our discussion below, we focus our attention on 
bank-type credit cards. 
 4 
3.  Trends in card ownership by income, education, and age 
Bank-type credit card ownership in the United States is strongly correlated 
with household income and with education, and this correlation has persisted over all 
waves of the SCF. However, the increase in bank-card ownership over the last two 
decades was especially pronounced at lower income and education levels, reflecting 
in part improvements in industry credit scoring techniques and risk analysis: in 1983, 
only 21 percent of households with less than a high school education and less than 23 
percent of households with incomes between $10,000 and $25,000 owned a bank-type 
credit card.
2 By 2001, these percentages had doubled, to 42 percent and 54 percent, 
respectively.  Table 1 reports card ownership, both for credit cards generally and for 
bank-type credit cards, for various demographic groups over time. Such tabulation is 
useful for describing ownership patterns across demographic groups, but not for 
identifying how each characteristic contributes to such ownership, controlling for 
other characteristics. 
To help distinguish the relative importance of age, education, and income as 
well as other factors that contribute to the likelihood of credit card ownership, table 2 
presents results of probit regressions of the probability of card ownership using the 
pooled sample of the 1983, 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001 waves of the Surveys of 
Consumer Finances.  Columns 1-3 list results from a model where the dependent 
variable is the 0-1 dummy variable capturing ownership of any type of credit card 
(including store and gas cards).  Columns 4-6 list results for ownership of at least one 
bank-type credit card.   
Higher levels of both education and income contribute significantly and 
importantly to the probability of ownership of either type of credit card, even 
controlling for other household characteristics. The difference between the 
coefficients on having a high school degree but no further education and having a 
college degree or higher
3 implies an effect about as large as the difference between an 
income between $10,000 and $24,999 (in 2001 $) and an income of at least $50,000; 
both these effects are about twice those of the difference in age from less than 35 to 
aged 50-65.  As would be expected, a higher level of financial wealth also contributes 
positively to card ownership, although the relative contribution of this variable is less 
notable than that of increased income or education.  5 
As these are reduced-form regressions, findings are the joint product of 
demand and supply considerations. On the demand side, education is likely to 
contribute to credit card ownership by increasing awareness of credit card instruments. 
Financial resources (both income and wealth) contribute in turn as scale variables 
determining the size of transactions, even though larger resources imply smaller needs 
for the borrowing feature of credit cards. Supply-side effects arise from the policy of 
credit card issuers to condition acceptance of applications on financial resources and 
to target specifically the more educated segments of the population. 
Supply-side effects are likely to contribute to the findings on the race variable. 
Non-white or Hispanic households are found to be significantly less likely to own a 
credit card, even after controlling for education, income, and financial wealth, and 
even after including the measure of whether the household reports being liquidity 
constrained.
4 More limited targeting of credit cards to minorities by credit card issuers 
may be the main factor behind this result. On the demand side, if future prospects for 
minorities are worse than what is implied by included controls, then this would tend to 
discourage both current spending and assumption of debt that would be difficult to 
repay later on.   
In both regressions, age is a significant factor in predicting card ownership.  
Even after controlling for income and wealth, households with a head aged 35-49 are 
less likely to own either type of credit card than are those with a head aged 50-65 (the 
omitted dummy variable), and households aged under 35 are even less likely to be 
card owners. More limited participation in young ages is likely to arise from supply-
side constraints rather than from demand considerations, as young households are 
more likely to want to have access to credit lines than their middle-aged counterparts. 
Households with a head 75 years or older are also significantly less likely to be card 
owners; indeed, the coefficient for age 75 or more is more than twice that of the 
coefficient for households aged under 35. More limited transaction needs and less 
familiarity with credit cards are likely to combine with less generous offers of credit 
cards to the elderly to produce this result. 
The regressions also include dummy variables for each of the survey years 
(with 2001 as the omitted dummy variable).  The relative sizes of the coefficients on 
these dummy variables in the bank-type card regression indicate significant year 
effects consistent with the spread of bank-type card ownership over the nearly 20-year 
period from 1983 to 2001 that are not explained by changes in configuration of 6 
already included household characteristics.  The coefficients on the year dummies in 
the regression of the broader class of credit cards are smaller and generally are less 
significant, consistent with the less dramatic spread in ownership of any type of credit 
card.  
By applying the estimated coefficients from the probit models to 
characteristics of various “typical” households, we can explore how the probability of 
card ownership has changed over time for these representative households.  Such 
calculations suggest that in particular young households and those with less education 
benefited from increased availability of bank-type credit cards.  For example, a single, 
non-white female aged less than 35 with high school education and “typical” income 
and financial assets for that age and education bracket has only a .32 estimated 
probability of owning a bank-type credit card in 1983.  By 1992, that estimated 
probability rises to .67, and by 2001 the estimated probability is .74.
5  A typical young 
college-educated white male has a notably higher estimated probability of bank-type 
credit card ownership in 1983 (.60) and has a slightly smaller increase in the 
probability of card ownership by 2001 (to .91).  For a middle-aged household, the rise 
in estimated probability of bank-type card ownership over time is less dramatic.  For a 
50-64 year old, married, college-educated household, the estimated probability of 
owning a bank-type card in 1983 is already .88; by 2001 the probability rises to .99.
6   
Similar calculations for a typical elderly household (age 75 or more) at various 
degrees of education also reveal a significant increase in the estimated probability of 
bank-type card ownership by 2001.  However, especially for these older households, 
both year effects and cohort effects are present.  For example, the typical married 
household aged 75 or more with some college education has an estimated probability 
of bank-type card ownership of .93 in 2001, an increase from .64 for elderly 
households in 1983.  But the over-75 household in 2001 would likely have been aged 
50-64 in 1983, and the estimated probability of bank-type card ownership for the 
household at that time would have been .73.  Thus, the higher estimated ownership of 
elderly households by 2001 may largely reflect the continued ownership of 
households who had acquired cards when younger.   
 
4.  Trends in debit card use 
In 2001, 38 percent of households without a credit card responded that buying 7 
things on an instalment plan was a “bad idea” compared with 27 percent of card-
owner households. Although credit cards may lead to spending control problems, 
debit cards— that is, cards that are linked to a specific account and when used, result 
in funds being withdrawn immediately—can provide the same benefits of cashless 
transactions with a form of self-control, as will be discussed below. Credit card 
ownership has grown rapidly between 1983 and 2001, but debit card use has grown 
even more rapidly and over a shorter time period. As of the 1992 SCF, less than 10 
percent of U.S. households owned a debit card (Table 3, columns 2 and 6). By 1995, 
one-third of households reported using a debit card, and by 2001 close to half reported 
debit card use.
7 As debit cards have become more widespread, households that use 
debit cards but not credit cards appear increasingly willing to describe borrowing on 
credit as a “bad idea”: in 1995, about 30 percent of households gave that response, 
and this fraction was about the same across credit card owners, debit card users, and 
non-card owners. By 2001, 40 percent of non-holders of credit cards who were debit 
card users gave the “bad idea” response, compared with 27 percent of credit card 
holders. 
Table 4 presents results from a probit regression of the probability of debit 
card use from the pooled sample of the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001 Surveys of 
Consumer Finances.
8  In contrast to the results on credit card ownership, younger 
households are much more likely to use debit cards than are older households, as the 
coefficient on households under age 35 is positive and significantly larger than that 
for age 35-49, which in turn is also positive and significantly different from zero. This 
result is likely to reflect the known tendency of banks to issue debit cards to younger 
households who have not yet acquired the financial resources or established the credit 
history needed for issuance of a credit card.   
Higher education is associated with an increased likelihood of debit card use, 
although households with a college degree are no more likely to use a debit card than 
those with only some college.  Households with higher incomes are also significantly 
more likely to use debit cards, except for those with incomes over $100,000; these 
households are actually slightly less likely to use debit cards than are households with 
incomes between $50,000 and $99,999.  Greater financial asset holdings are 
associated with a small but significant effect on debit card use.   8 
Since education and financial resources tend to encourage provision of credit 
cards by issuers, these findings do not arise from lack of access to credit cards. Rather, 
they are likely to reflect a deliberate choice of more educated and well-to-do 
households to benefit from the ease of using debit cards for payments, as compared to 
using checks that are less widely acceptable. It is noteworthy that such tendency of 
using debit cards is observed, despite the fact that use of credit cards for payments but 
not for borrowing usually contributes extra benefits, such as points or floating 
opportunities. We return to such issues below. Among other demographics, 
particularly interesting is the finding that although nonwhite/Hispanic households are 
significantly less likely than white households to have a credit card, they are no less 
likely to use a debit card.   
As with bank-type card ownership, the year dummies are significant, with 
relative sizes and signs consistent with the spread in debit card use.  Performing the 
same calculations for various “typical” households as we did for credit cards 
illustrates the adoption of debit cards over the 1990s particularly by younger 
households, but also suggests that debit card use has not been universally or 
exclusively adopted by households who also are very likely to have access to a bank-
type credit card.  For the young, nonwhite, high-school educated female, the estimated 
probability of having a debit card in 1992 is .22, less than the likelihood of having a 
bank-type card in 1992.  By 2001, the estimated probability of using a debit card 
is .65, a sizable increase but still somewhat below that of having a bank-type card.  
For the single white college-educated male, the estimated probability of using a debit 
card is .21 in 1992 and increases to .64 in 2001, remaining well below the probability 
of bank-type card ownership.  For the 50-64 year old college-educated married 
household, the probability of using a debit card rises from .12 in 1992 and reaches 
only .50 in 2001. 
 
5.  Credit card use over time and across demographic groups 
While the fraction of households with a bank-type card has increased, the SCF 
data indicate that the fraction of card holders who at any time revolve a credit card 
balance has changed relatively little over the past 20 years. In 1983, just over half of 
all bank-type credit card holders carried a balance on a card, after making the most 9 
recent payment, and before incurring new charges (Table 1, column 5). By 1995, the 
percentage rose to 56, but it declined slightly in the next two surveys, to 53 percent by 
2001. In all of the SCF waves, younger households are much more likely to carry a 
balance than are older households. In contrast to the inverse relation between level of 
education and card ownership, the relation between education and carrying a credit 
card balance, conditional on card ownership (except for college-educated households ), 
is less pronounced,. Between 43 and 49 percent of card-owner households with a 
college degree revolve a credit card balance in each of the Survey years, generally 
about 15 percentage points less than households with either a high school degree or 
some college education. 
The distribution of credit card revolvers by income shows a changing pattern 
over the SCF waves. In earlier waves, card-holder households who fell in the lowest 
income ranges were less likely to carry a credit card balance than were households in 
the next two income ranges. In 1998 and 2001, this relationship was reversed, and a 
larger fraction of low-income card-holders revolved credit than did middle-income 
card holders. These simple statistics do not allow us to identify the reasons for the 
increase in low-income credit revolvers, but one likely explanation is that low-income 
households who nonetheless qualified for credit cards in the earlier waves were older 
and consequently may have had less need to borrow. Nearly half of card-holder 
households with incomes under $10,000 in 1983 were over 65, and less than 20 
percent were under 35. By 2001, this age pattern had reversed, as households over 65 
accounted for less than 30 percent of low-income card-holders, while more than a 
third were under 35. 
In all the SCF waves, a much smaller percentage of card-owner households 
with incomes over $100,000 than with lower incomes carried a credit card balance. 
These higher-income households may have had less need or incentive to revolve 
credit card debt, or may have had better access to other sources of borrowing, 
particularly through tax-advantaged home equity lines. Indeed, over 90 percent of 
high-income families in 2001 had home equity against which they could borrow, with 
the median amount equal to about $130,000.
9 Nonetheless, a significant portion of 
relatively high-income households revolve credit: more than one-third of households 
in that income range were credit revolvers in all survey years. 
 10 
6.  Repeated versus occasional credit revolvers  
Because the SCF is a cross section sample for each survey year and not a panel, 
we cannot observe whether a card balance for a given household was a temporary 
event or whether that household had carried a balance in the previous months. 
However, we use self-reported information to help distinguish habitual revolvers from 
those whose card balance is temporary or accidental. In each of the survey waves, 
households with credit cards were asked whether they “always or almost always” paid 
off the card balance in full each month, they “sometimes” paid it off in full, or 
whether they “hardly ever” paid it off. The surveys also collect information on the 
new charges made on the bank-type card after payment of the last bill. We use these 
new charges data to get an idea of which households who do not carry a balance on 
their credit cards appear to  actively use their cards.
10  
Table 1 shows the percentages in each survey year of households who had a 
bank-type credit card (column 2), those who had a card but had no balance on the card 
and incurred no new charges in the current month (column 3),  those who had no 
balance but did incur new charges (column 4), and those who had a balance and 
hardly ever paid off the balance (column 6; the complementary percentage had a 
balance but claimed they usually or sometimes paid off the balance each month). 
Bearing in mind the difference in how these variables are constructed in the 1983 and 
later SCF waves, it nonetheless appears that the fraction of card holders who had a 
card but did not actively use it has declined over time, from about 18 percent of card-
holders in 1983 to 10 percent in 1992 and between 7 and 8 percent  subsequently.  
In all survey waves, the largest percentages of card-holder households who do 
not use their cards are those who are over 65, have no more than a high school 
education, and generally are those with incomes under $25,000. It is possible that 
these households are passive cardholders who have been issued a card without 
actively seeking one. Alternatively, they may be concerned about their ability to 
control their spending, and prefer to consider the card for emergency use only. 
Additional information available only from the 1998 and 2001 Surveys indicates that 
households in this category were about twice as likely to have ever declared 
bankruptcy as card-holders who did not carry a balance but did record active card use, 
suggesting some role for concerns about over-spending and the social stigma of 
delinquency and bankruptcy.  11 
A little less than 40 percent of card-holder households from the 1992-2001 
waves had no outstanding balance on their credit card but did record new charges 
during the month (column 4). For the 1983 SCF, a comparable figure is 30 percent of 
cardholders who had no balance, but claimed they used their card “often” or 
“sometimes.” These households appear to use their credit cards for ease of 
transactions and perhaps to benefit from the float offered by deferring payment until 
the credit card bill is due. According to the 2001 survey, 96 percent of these 
households report that they “always or almost always” pay off their balance in full 
each month. In all surveys, the percentages of card-holder households that fall into 
this category are largest for older households and those with a college degree and at 
least $100,000 in income: households that presumably have less need to borrow 
especially at high rates of interest, which are likely to face less income variability, and 
are more likely to have a sufficient buffer-stock of assets to tide them over income 
fluctuations. In 1998 and 2001, these households were also the least likely to have 
declared bankruptcy in the previous 10 years. 
About a quarter of all card holders in 2001—and almost half of those who had 
a balance outstanding on their card—admitted to “hardly ever” paying off the balance 
each month (column 6). These fractions are relatively unchanged from earlier waves 
of the SCF. For the most part, this percentage is not much affected by age, education, 
or income, with the exception that households with incomes over $100,000 are less 
likely to fall into this category. The fact that this behavior cuts across many 
demographic and income groups suggests that frequent card revolvers may be 
motivated by factors other than simply a “need to borrow.” One category of 
households that does seem to have increased slightly over time is cardholders who 
claim they “always or almost always” pay off the balance in full but nonetheless had a 
balance outstanding at the time of the survey: that percentage has drifted upwards 
from less than 10 percent of cardholders in 1992 (18 percent of those with a balance) 
to 12 percent in 2001 (22 percent of those with a balance). These households may be 
accidental revolvers who typically do pay off balances but for whatever reason carried 
a balance in the month preceding the survey. 
Table 5 explores the relation between the percentage of U.S. households who 
have been denied credit by credit card ownership and card payment status. This 
“liquidity constrained” information is taken from a series of questions asked in the 12 
SCF on whether the household, in the previous five years, had been turned down for 
credit or had not received as much credit as requested (and had not received the full 
credit amount on reapplying), or had not applied for credit because they thought they 
would be turned down. Roughly one-third of households without a bank-type credit 
card can be classified as “liquidity constrained” according to this definition. 
Interestingly, as the fraction of households with at least one bank-type credit card has 
grown, so has the fraction of these card-holder households that can be classified as 
“liquidity constrained”: from 12 percent in 1983 to 17 percent in 2001.  
For 1992-2001, we can further distinguish the type of credit for which the 
household was turned down; roughly one-third of card holders apparently had 
requested additional credit in the form of a credit card. Households with no balance on 
their card but with new charges are the least likely to be credit constrained; only about 
6 percent are so classified for any type of credit, and about 4 percent for credit other 
than a credit card. Roughly one-third of the frequent credit card revolvers (those with 
a balance who hardly ever pay it off in full) can be classified as “liquidity 
constrained” but only one fifth identify the type of credit denied as other than for a 
credit card. In other words, about 80 percent of frequent card revolvers do not claim 
that they have been denied another form of credit. Although they do not appear to be 
revolving credit card debt by default, they may have decided that switching to lower 
cost forms of credit is too costly in terms of transactions or time costs, or they may be 
unaware that other sources of credit, possibly at more attractive terms, are available. 
 
7.  Credit card balances, utilization, interest rates 
7.1.  Median amounts charged 
Table 6 shows the median card balance of households who revolve credit, by 
each survey year, and differentiating between households who claim to “almost 
always” or “sometimes” pay off the balance each month from those who admit that 
they “hardly ever” pay off the balance.
11 Households who usually revolve credit tend, 
not surprisingly, to have larger balances on their credit cards than do households who 
indicate only occasional credit card revolving. The median amount of credit card debt 
outstanding for occasional revolvers increased from about $700 in 1983 to over 
$1,150 in 1995, but has since declined slightly, to about $1,000 in 2001. The median 13 
balance for credit revolvers has increased by more, and in recent years has been more 
than twice as large: it has grown from $1,244 in 1983 to $3,260 in 1998 and $2,800 in 
2001. 
Credit card balances of households that are occasional revolvers show less 
variation by age, education, and income than do the balances of households who 
usually revolve credit. Among households who usually carry a balance, the median 
credit card balance generally has been between $2,500 and $3,000 for households 
aged less than 65, but only about $1,500 for older households. Although Table 1 
indicates that a smaller percentage of card-holding households with college education 
revolve credit card debt, those that do revolve their card debt tend to carry larger 
balances than do households with less education. The median balance for college 
educated usual revolvers has increased from about $3,000 in 1992 and 1995 to $4,775 
in 1998 and $4,000 in 2001. By contrast, the median balance for a credit-revolving 
household with high school education generally has been between $2,000 and $2,500. 
Similarly, although a smaller percentage of higher-income households usually choose 
to revolve credit than do lower-income households, those that do typically carry larger 
balances than do households with lower incomes. 
 
7.2.  Credit limits, utilization rates, and interest rates 
To some extent, higher card balances of college-educated and higher-income 
credit revolvers reflects higher credit limits available to such households. Starting 
with the 1995 survey, data were collected on the total bank-type card limit—that is, 
the maximum amount that could be charged on the all bank-type credit cards owned 
by the household—as well as on the interest rate charged on the card with the highest 
balance (or the most frequently used card, if the balance on all cards was zero). 
Table 6 indicates that credit limits are generally highest for households that 
have demonstrated that they can handle credit card accounts responsibly, and not 
necessarily those that have the greatest need to borrow. Credit limits tend to be 
highest for those that carry no balance but actively use their cards, or that carry a 
balance although they at least sometimes pay the balance in full. The median credit 
limit for these households ranges from $10,000 to $15,000, depending on the survey 
year. Households that either do not use their cards actively or usually revolve credit 14 
typically have credit limits of under $10,000  and often closer to $7,500. Credit limits 
are typically larger for households aged between 35 and 64 than for households under 
35, and are somewhat larger than for households over 65. Credit limits also tend to be 
higher for households with higher levels of education and higher income. Table 6 also 
indicates that between 1995 and 2001, the median card limit declined for younger 
households, for those with less than high school education, and for those with incomes 
below $10,000. Multiple factors are likely to have contributed to the decline in the 
median card limit, but in part it may reflect the increase in card ownership by these 
demographic groups. The typical lower-education or lower income household who 
nonetheless qualified for a bank-type credit card in 1995 may have had a somewhat 
higher credit rating than the typical such household in 2001. 
Columns 8 and 12 show the median credit card utilization rates of households 
that revolve credit, constructed as the balance remaining on the card after the last 
payment plus any new charges made on the card over the current month, divided by 
the available credit limit.
12 Households who have a balance but at least sometimes pay 
it off had a median card utilization rate of 15 percent in 1995; the utilization rate was 
just under 20 percent in 1998 and then declined a bit to 17.5 percent in 2001. 
Households that hardly ever pay off balances have considerably higher median 
utilization rates of almost 40 percent in 1995 and about 50 percent in 1998 and 2001. 
These higher utilization rates reflect both the higher card balances of this group as 
well as the somewhat lower card limits these households face. Nearly one-tenth of 
card holders and just under 20 percent of those who revolved credit in 2001 had a 
credit card utilization rate of 75 percent or more. A similar percentage of card users 
had high utilization rates in 1998, but only about half as many did in 1995. In all 
survey waves, these households were more likely to be young and to have less than 
college level education. Most high-utilization households “hardly ever” pay off their 
card balance. More than half of high-utilization households (and over 70 percent of 
young households) can be classified as “liquidity constrained,” compared with less 
than 20 percent of households with lower utilization rates and 6 percent of card users 
without an outstanding balance. Although the cross-section nature of the SCF 
prevents us from investigating the relation between current high card utilization rates 
and future default or bankruptcy filings—a topic we consider in more detail in Section 
10—high-utilization households do appear more likely to exhibit indicators of 15 
financial difficulty: 18 percent of high-utilization households in 2001 indicated that in 
the previous year they had been two months or more behind in any type of loan 
payment, compared with only about 5 percent for all households.
13 
 
7.3.  Average interest rates, new charges, and expenses of revolvers 
Although low introductory or “teaser” interest rates of 1 to 5 percent can make 
the interest costs of carrying a balance on a credit card credit negligible, Table 6 
indicates that most habitual credit card revolvers pay relatively high rates of interest. 
For the typical household who sometimes paid off the balance in full, the 
median interest rate charged ranged from 13 to 14.8 percent, depending on the survey 
year. For households that usually revolve debt, the typical interest rate was 15 to 16 
percent, implying an annual interest rate cost of about $400, if the balance during the 
survey month and new charges recorded are representative of the normal monthly 
balance and charges. In 2001, less than 4 percent of frequent revolvers had interest 
rates of 5 percent or less on the bank-type card with the largest balance; almost 19 
percent faced interest rates above 20 percent.  
 
8.  Asset holdings by card payment patterns and demographic groups  
In this section we explore asset holdings of card owners and credit revolvers to 
highlight the puzzles of simultaneous accumulation of assets with high-cost credit 
card debt. In all survey years, the highest levels of median liquid assets (defined as 
amounts held in checking accounts, savings accounts, money market deposit accounts, 
and call accounts at brokerages), median financial assets, and median total net worth 
are for those households that used their bank-type credit card to make new charges, 
but did not have a balance outstanding. This relative ranking holds for all survey years, 
and for virtually all demographic subgroups, and in fact has become more pronounced 
over time. In 2001 dollars, median financial assets of households in this category in 
2001 were $125,000, more than double the financial assets of such households in 
1983, and median net worth at nearly $320,000 was about 50 percent higher. This 
increase in wealth can be explained in large part by the rise in the equity market over 
the 1990s and increased ownership of equities by these households: in 1983, less than 16 
half of households in this category were stockholders, but by 2001 that fraction was 
75 percent. 
The next highest median asset levels are held by those who have a card but did 
not use it to make new charges. On average, their median asset holdings are about 
one-third to one-half as large as those of active card users without a balance. 
Households who have a balance but at least sometimes pay their balance off 
have asset levels a bit lower than those of card owners but non-users, indicating that 
these households are able to accumulate financial assets. Households that hardly ever 
pay the card balance off have notably lower wealth levels, with median wealth 
averaging about half as large as for “sometimes” revolvers, and about one-fifth as 
large as for those who use cards but do not carry a balance. In all survey years, 
households without bank-type credit cards have the lowest amount of assets. The 
decline in median net worth of these households between 1983 and 2001 reflects the 
previously noted spread of card ownership to households with lower incomes. 
 
9.  Coexistence of low-interest liquid assets and high-interest card debt 
Gross and Souleles (2002a) point out that over 90 percent of households with 
credit card debt in the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances have some very liquid 
assets in checking and savings accounts, which usually yield at most 1–2 percent. 
One-third of credit card borrowers have more than one month’s worth of gross total 
household income in liquid assets. Such large holdings of low-interest liquid assets 
are difficult to explain on the basis of transaction needs, and arbitrage considerations 
would call for them to be used to pay down, if not completely pay off, high-interest 
credit card debt.
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In our tabulations here, we will take a more conservative stance that probably 
understates the puzzle. Tables 7 and 8 shows median card balances, liquid assets, 
financial assets, and net worth for all households and for those that carried a balance, 
differentiating between households that had liquid assets no larger than the credit card 
balance, and those that had liquid assets greater than the credit card balance (and at 
least $1,000 and at least half of total monthly income). Households that carry a credit 
card balance but appear to have more than enough liquid financial assets to pay off the 
balance in full are remarkably numerous. In 1995, 39 percent of credit card revolvers 17 
fell into this category; about 45 percent can be so classified in 1998 and 2001. In all 
years, the typical household that was a high-liquid-asset revolver had an unpaid bank-
type credit card balance of about $1,000, while median liquid assets were six to eight 
times larger. These households also have fairly substantial holdings of total financial 
assets and net worth. Although some of these households may be accidental credit 
revolvers in the survey month, the majority claims only to “sometimes” pay of the 
balance in full, and about one-third admit to “hardly ever” paying off their card 
balance. 
These households could potentially have greater liquid asset needs than do 
other households, but this seems unlikely. In comparison with assets held by other 
survey households on Table 7, their liquid asset holdings appear somewhat larger than 
those who have a card but do not actively use it, but generally somewhat smaller than 
those of households that use cards but do not carry a balance. If the balance carried in 
the survey month is indicative of the balance carried throughout the year and the new 
charges recorded are indicative of the normal monthly charges, then the estimated 
annual interest cost paid by these households by not paying off the balance is on the 
order of $100 to $200. 
 
10. Theories of credit card behavior  
Before reviewing theories of credit card behavior, it is useful to examine 
whether puzzling observed tendencies can be attributed  imply to ignorance or limited 
understanding of the terms and conditions of credit card accounts. If so, it should be 
possible to restore optimal behavior through better information.  
 
10.1.  Are households unaware of credit card terms? 
Luckily, survey data make it possible to seek an answer to this question. In 
January 2000, the Credit Research Center sponsored a survey of nearly 500 
households (representative of the forty eight contiguous US states) that investigated 
consumers’ attitudes towards credit cards. A more recent such survey was conducted 
in 2001, and their main findings are reported in Durkin (2000 for the older Survey; 
2002 for the newer). Durkin (2000) also contrasts them with findings from earlier 
Surveys of Consumer Finances in 1970 and 1977. We report Durkin’s main findings 18 
in this Section. Which terms of credit card agreements are regarded as important by 
consumers when opening a new or replacement card account? The January 2001 
Survey found that cost items predominate, mainly annual percentage rates and finance 
charges, as indicated by responses of about two thirds of consumers. This percentage 
is not influenced by whether respondents did or did not possess a bank-type credit 
card. Three fifths of those without cards thought that these were the most important 
terms, compared to slightly more than half of cardholders. The latter assign higher 
importance than do non-holders to annual fees, fixed versus variable rates, and 
frequent flier miles. 
Respondents in the 2000 Survey are “aware” of the annual percentage rates 
(APR’s) charged on their revolving credit card debt. If we consider as “unaware” only 
those who state explicitly that they do not know the rate, then 91 percent of holders of 
bank-type credit cards are aware of their APR. If we also eliminate those who say that 
they know their rate but report too low an APR (i.e., an APR below 7.9 percent in 
2000), then the proportion of aware holders falls to 85 percent.
15 Although awareness 
varies slightly across demographic groups, it exceeds 80 percent for all groups using 
either definition. Among groups with highest awareness of APR’s were those with 
more than $1,500 in revolving debt and those reporting that they hardly ever pay off 
their balance in full. A major factor promoting awareness was the introduction of the 
Truth in Lending Act of 1969, which requires credit card  companies to provide 
customers with written statements of credit costs, both at the opening of the account 
and on each monthly bill. After its introduction, awareness jumped from 27 percent of 
card holders to 63 percent in 1970 and to 71 percent in 1977. 
Not only are holders of bank-type credit cards aware of the terms, but two 
thirds of them report that information about credit terms is easy to obtain; only 7 
percent think that it is very difficult. Despite such responses, slightly less than half of 
bank-type card holders in 2000 agree that card issuers give holders enough 
information to enable them to use their credit cards wisely. Part of the additional 
information the rest ask for is already provided on the statements. 
Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, households are much more willing 
to declare negative attitudes regarding the use of credit cards made by others than by 
themselves. Holders of bank-type credit cards declared in 2000 that “other 
consumers” are confused about credit card practices, but approximately ninety percent 19 
of them declare satisfaction with their own card companies, and say that it is easy to 
get another card if they are not treated fairly. In the 2001 Survey, two thirds respond 
that useful information on credit terms was very easy or somewhat easy to obtain for 
themselves, but fewer than half say so for others. The same percentages apply also to 
the question of whether credit card companies provided sufficient information to use 
credit cards wisely. All in all, these findings suggest that credit card holders are well 
informed about the terms they face, especially if they revolve credit card debt, though 
they do not give much credit to their card issuers for providing the information and 
they have little faith that others are equally well informed. 
 
10.2.  Stickiness of credit card interest rates 
In his seminal 1991 paper, Ausubel documents considerable stickiness of 
credit card rates despite extensive competition in the credit card market. This is all the 
more puzzling in view of the evidence presented above that credit card holders are 
generally aware of annual percentage rates, and they consider them very important. 
He points to the low concentration and considerable breadth of the industry, its 
freedom from interstate banking and branch banking restrictions, the 
nonresponsiveness of interest rates to fluctuations in the cost of funds to the banks, 
and to his finding that returns from the credit card business were several times higher 
than the ordinary rate of return in banking during the period he examines (1983-
1988).
16  Ausubel considers search and switch costs that can make it difficult for 
consumers to move to different, lower-cost providers of credit cards.
17 He bases his 
adverse-selection theory on a class of consumers who do not intend to revolve credit 
card debt but find themselves doing so; and on another class of consumers that fully 
intend to borrow but are bad credit risks. In such a world, good customers exhibit 
some irrationality and are not particularly responsive to lower interest rates. Banks, on 
the other hand, do not want to lower interest rates, fearing that they will draw   
disproportionate numbers of bad risks. Thus, interest rates end up being sticky.
18  
Brito and Hartley (1995) argue that observed revolving of credit card debt 
need not be attributed to consumer irrationality, but to the ease of borrowing on the 
credit card compared to transactions costs involved in other types of loans. They 
construct a model in which relatively small costs of arranging for other types of loans 20 
can induce rational individuals to borrow on high-interest credit cards. Calem and 
Mester (1995) use data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances to test for the 
presence of search and switch costs. Controlling for demand and for access to credit, 
they find that the level of credit card debt is greater among consumers who tend not to 
shop around for the best terms on loans or deposits. This tendency not to shop around 
can be attributed perhaps to an irrational belief that debt revolving is likely to be 
temporary, but it can also arise simply from higher search costs. 
Calem and Mester also find that households with higher outstanding balances 
are more likely to be denied credit and to have experienced payment problems. Thus, 
customers with high balances face greater costs of switching to a provider that offers 
more attractive credit terms, because providers are likely to interpret their high 
balances as a signal of lack of creditworthiness. There may also be good credit risks 
who have been granted privileges by their existing credit card providers, such as large 
credit  lines, and who therefore face switch costs of a different kind. More recent 
studies corroborate the view that the size of credit card debt influences the probability 
of declaring bankruptcy or delinquency. Domowitz and Sartain (1999) find that 
households with more credit card debt are more likely to file for bankruptcy. Gross 
and Souleles (2002b), who do not use survey data but an administrative set of credit 
card accounts, find that, even after controlling for account credit scores used by the 
credit card companies, accounts with larger balances and purchases, or smaller 
payments, are more likely to default. 
Based on these findings, credit card issuers would be justified to regard high 
balances and purchases as bad signals, even after taking credit scores into account, 
despite the potential to earn more on consumers revolving large amounts of debt.
19 In 
the presence of search or switch costs, issuers would find that lowering interest rates 
does not attract many consumers who revolve credit card debt but are good credit 
risks, and this could contribute to stickiness of interest rates. Clearly, understanding 
the reasons and motives underlying bankruptcy and delinquency is central to 
understanding credit card behavior. It is to this that we now turn.  
 
10.3.  Bankruptcy, delinquency, and strategic default 
In the late 1990s, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of personal 21 
bankruptcy filings in the United States, as well as in delinquency rates on credit cards. 
The former rose by about 75 percent, and the latter almost as sharply (Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland, 1998). Personal bankruptcy filings rose from 0.3 percent 
of households per year in 1984 to around 1.35 percent in 1998 and 1999, while 
lenders lost about $39 billion in 1998 because of personal bankruptcy filings (Fay, 
Hurst, White, 2002). In this Section, we first examine this phenomenon in some detail 
and  we then ask whether strategic default motives could justify observed portfolio 
behavior of debt revolvers.  
 
10.3.1.  Bankruptcy and delinquency in credit cards  
An important question is whether the recent increase in bankruptcy and 
delinquency rates signals an increased tendency of households to engage in such 
activities, controlling for their characteristics, economic conditions, and factors 
governing credit supply; or whether it simply reflects a worsening of the risk pool due 
to extension of credit to less credit-worthy individuals. Gross and Souleles (2002b) 
provide an in-depth study of this issue, using an administrative panel of thousands of 
individual credit card accounts from several different card issuers.
20 One of the major 
advantages of this data set is that it includes thousands of observations of low-
probability events such as bankruptcy and delinquency, and it encompasses data 
observed by credit card issuers. The latter feature allows the authors to control for 
changes in credit supply and risk composition that were observable by the issuers, 
including increases in credit lines. 
The authors find some role for lower credit scores, larger balances and 
purchases, smaller payments, unemployment, weak house prices, and lack of health 
insurance in accounting for higher bankruptcy or delinquency rates, but only for a 
small part of the observed change in the late 1990s. Somewhat surprisingly, increases 
in credit lines were not found to contribute to the phenomenon of default, suggesting 
that these were extended to less risky accounts. Even controlling for all of these 
factors, the propensity to default increased significantly between 1995 and 1997.
21 
Interestingly, the size of the increase in propensity to default goes up with the number 
of people in one’s state who have previously filed for bankruptcy. 22 
Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) use retrospective questions on bankruptcy 
contained in the 1996 PSID and also find that, controlling for state and time fixed 
effects, households are more likely to file for bankruptcy if they live in districts with 
higher aggregate filing rates. In addition to social stigma, they cite evidence reported 
in Braucher (1993) and in Sullivan et al. (1989) that the administration and practice of 
bankruptcy law by lawyers and judges varies across bankruptcy districts, in a way that 
can create differential incentives to file for bankruptcy across districts. Such findings 
are consistent with a role for increased acceptability and ease of filing in determining 
the incidence of bankruptcy, though it is difficult to make the case conclusive. Fay et 
al. find little support for the idea that households file for bankruptcy when adverse 
events reduce their ability to repay.
22  Instead, they find that households are more 
likely to file when bankruptcy yields higher financial benefits: the authors find that 
the value of the debt discharged in bankruptcy, but not the value of non-exempt assets, 
plays a significant role in bankruptcy decision.
23 Fay et al. interpret their findings as 
evidence in favor of strategic behavior in bankruptcy filings, but perhaps a safer 
conclusion is that bankruptcy law provisions can encourage bankruptcy, controlling 
for the overall situation of the household. It should also be noted that the findings here, 
unlike those of Gross and Souleles (2002b), are subject to limitations imposed by the 
small number of bankruptcy observations in a survey representative of the entire 
population. 
More recently, Dunn and Kim (2004) utilize Ohio data in the late 1990s from 
the Ohio Survey Research Center.
24 When the number of missed minimum credit card 
payments in the last six months is regressed on household financial and socio-
economic variables, three financial variables have a significant positive effect: the 
ratio of the total amount of required minimum payments on credit cards to household 
income; the number of credit cards on which the consumer has exhausted the credit 
limit; and the credit card utilization rate, measured as a percentage of the sum total of 
credit lines available to the consumer. Interestingly, education, income, and 
homeownership status are not found to influence default in the presence of these three 
financial variables. Such findings seem to provide support to the notion that ability to 
repay is an important factor behind delinquencies. The sample is then divided into 
“convenience users” who pay off the balance each month, borrowers with no default 
history, and borrowers with default history. Using tabulations, the authors find that the 23 
number of credit cards held increases on average from 2.5 to 4.6 as we move from 
convenience users to default borrowers, while the total credit line per card halves, 
from about $10,000 to about $5,000. The sum total of credit lines also drops from 
about $21,000 to about $18,000. Although no conclusive case can be made yet, these 
tabulations are consistent with “Ponzi scheme” practices of obtaining additional cards 
with small credit lines in order to pay off old credit card debt. 
The overall conclusion from findings on bankruptcy is that this phenomenon 
has recently become more frequent, mostly for demand reasons and much less 
because of a worsening of the risk pool or increased readiness of credit card 
companies to provide larger credit lines. Households seem to be encouraged to declare 
bankruptcy by existing financial incentives for doing so, as well as by the prevalence 
of bankruptcies and by the ease with which bankruptcies are handled by judges and 
lawyers in their geographical localities. Evidence that default occurs also because of 
difficulties in meeting minimum payments and in borrowing additional funds is less 
clear, but need for funds cannot be ruled out as a source of household bankruptcy, 
especially in view of the role it seems to be playing in delinquencies.  
 
10.3.2.  Strategic default as an explanation for debt revolving  
The widespread co-existence of credit card debt with substantial liquid assets 
in Survey of Consumer Finances data could derive, at least for some households, from 
strategic bankruptcy motives. If a household holds liquid assets and declares 
bankruptcy, it can take advantage of bankruptcy law provisions that exempt some 
assets from seizure, up to an exemption level. Thus, households who plan to declare 
bankruptcy have no incentive to pay off credit card debt with liquid assets. As pointed 
out by Lehnert and Maki (2001), a household can discharge a large part of unsecured 
debt based on chapter 7 bankruptcy laws, and may convert liquid assets to a 
bankruptcy-exempt asset category in its state of residence, like housing for example. 
Lopes (2003) calibrates and solves a life-cycle model with uncollateralized borrowing 
and default, and finds that some consumers borrow with the intention of defaulting in 
the near future. Education matters for the incidence of default, because it affects the 
slope and level of the earnings profile, and hence the value attached to the loss of 
credit availability and stigma associated with  bankruptcy in the model. Because of 24 
the exemption limit, savings can co-exist with borrowing. Average simulated savings 
for those who borrow are higher in cases where the probability of default is higher 
(e.g., they monotonically drop with education). 
As to empirical evidence, Lehnert and Maki find in Consumer Expenditure 
Survey data that households living in states with high bankruptcy exemption levels 
are 1 to 4.5 percentage points more likely to have both liquid assets and total 
unsecured debt in excess of a threshold ranging between $2,000 and $5,000 (in 1996 
dollars). Lopes regresses liquid financial wealth for debt revolvers on exemption level 
for the household’s region and on demographics, and finds a positive and significant 
coefficient on exemption level in the 1998 SCF. There is also evidence that links 
bankruptcy law, and its application, to the incidence of default. Fay et al. (2002) 
found that state fixed effects are significant for the incidence of default. Indeed, they 
found that, even after controlling for state fixed effects, households are more likely to 
file for bankruptcy if they live in a district with higher aggregate bankruptcy rates, or 
with more lawyers per capita. Gross and Souleles (2002b) similarly found evidence 
that the tendency to declare bankruptcy is greater for households living in states with 
greater numbers of people who have previously declared bankruptcy.  
While a strategic bankruptcy motive can explain the behavior of some 
households, it is hard to believe that it does so for the majority of households with 
substantial liquid assets. For one thing, the phenomenon of portfolio co-existence 
seems too widespread relative to the still limited incidence of bankruptcies in the 
population. To suggest that all of these households, across all demographic groups, 
are motivated in their behavior by strategic bankruptcy motives even though a 
miniscule portion of them actually default, and some of them not even strategically, 
seems unwarranted. Moreover, as pointed out by Gross and Souleles (2002a), even if 
strategic default motives were so widespread, strategic defaulters do not need to pay 
the interest costs of revolving high-rate balances and holding low-rate assets before 
they declare bankruptcy. They should instead run up their debts and buy exempt 
assets right before filing. 
 
10.4.  Debt levels and utilization rates of credit lines 
Gross and Souleles (2002a) use the same proprietary administrative data set of 25 
individual credit card accounts from different card issuers described above to estimate 
responses of credit card debt levels and utilization rates of credit lines to exogenous 
increases in credit lines and to changes in interest rates. By exogenous increases, they 
mean credit line increases initiated by the credit card providers themselves, and not by 
card holders.
25 They find that, over the year following an exogenous line increase, 
each extra $1,000 of liquidity (i.e. credit line) generates on average a $130 increase in 
credit card debt. Thus, liquidity matters, unlike what is implied by standard permanent 
income models. Estimates of this “Marginal Propensity to Consume” (MPC) are 
significantly larger for accounts exhibiting greater utilization of credit lines, rising to 
about 50 percent for accounts with more than 90 percent utilization. The average long 
run elasticity of debt to the interest rate on the account is estimated to be 
approximately -1.3, with less than half of this representing balance-shifting across 
credit cards. The elasticity is larger than average for interest rate declines, providing a 
possible justification for the popularity of low introductory (“teaser”) interest rates. It 
is also smaller among accounts with high utilization rates than among those with 
utilization rates between 50 and 90 percent. The authors uncover a remarkable 
response of credit card utilization rates to increases in credit lines initiated by banks. 
Regardless of the credit line utilization rate, the long-run cumulative response of 
utilization rates to an exogenous line increase is quite small, implying a return of 
utilization near to its initial level in about five months following the line increase. 
Although such behavior would be easier to understand had households themselves 
requested the line increase, it is less straightforward to interpret given that the 
initiative came from the banks themselves. 
As the authors suggest, such behavior can be justified in the context of buffer 
stock models of asset accumulation. In such models, households face nondiversifiable 
income risk and choose, as a result, to hold a precautionary buffer of assets so as to be 
able to shield future consumption levels from shocks to their financial resources.
26 
The same logic applies to available credit lines. Although these are not assets per se, 
they perform a similar function as a means to maintain consumption in the face of 
income shocks. Thus, households facing income uncertainty choose not to utilize their 
credit lines fully, but to leave a portion unused, adopting target utilization rates for 
credit cards. 
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10.5.  Self-control explanations of credit card debt 
Alternative explanations of portfolio behavior by credit card holders depart 
from the standard framework by incorporating self-control problems. These models 
are part of a much broader literature based on Psychology and Marketing insights (for 
an excellent overview, see Shane et al., 2002). Existing approaches differ, but all 
assume that the separation of consumption from payment made possible by credit 
leads to excessive expenditures, and that moderating these tendencies is possible, if 
costly, through the coexistence of revolving credit card debt and low-interest liquid 
assets and/or retirement. The types of co-existence that can be justified and the 
technical complications in solving such models depend crucially on the specific 
framework, as will be seen below.  
 
10.5.1.  Impulsive behavior and costly self control 
The idea that self-control matters for credit card behavior is not foreign to 
either the general public or to professionals in Psychology and in Marketing. Durkin 
(2000) reports that public opinion regarding credit cards seems more polarized in 
2000 than in 1970, with the majority (51 percent) of all families declaring in 2000 that 
use of credit cards is “bad”. Among credit card holders, such negative attitudes are 
more prevalent among those who typically revolve credit card debt. 
Households are much more willing to declare negative attitudes regarding the 
use of credit cards made by others than by themselves. Durkin (2001) reports that 
holders of bank-type credit cards declared in 2000 that too much credit is available, 
and that “others” have difficulty getting out of credit card debt, while ninety percent 
of them recognized that overspending is the fault of “other consumers” and not of 
credit card companies. In the 2001 Survey of Consumers, only ten percent of 
banktype credit card holders responded that credit cards made managing finances 
more difficult for them, citing overspending and overextending financial resources as 
the main reasons. However, forty percent felt that managing finances was made more 
difficult for “others”, mainly because of overspending, too much debt, and a 
continuing cycle of debt (Durkin, 2002). 
Among researchers in marketing and in consumer psychology, self-control 
problems are known to occur when the benefits of consumption come earlier than the 27 
costs (Hoch and Loewenstein, 1991). Credit cards do separate purchases and 
payments, and there is evidence that liquidity, of the type provided by the 
acceptability of credit cards, both makes it more likely that the consumer will buy a 
given item, and increases the amount that the consumer is willing to pay for the item 
conditional on purchase (see Shefrin and Thaler, 1988; Prelec and Simester, 2001; 
Wertenbroch, 2003). Indeed, this may be a reason why sellers accept credit card 
payments despite the service charges this entails. 
Imposing self-control is possible, if costly, and there is ample anecdotal 
evidence on precommitment and self-rationing strategies (see, for example, Hoch and 
Loewenstein, 1991; Schelling, 1992; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981, and Wertenbroch, 
2003). A telling example refers to deadlines that various people, including academics, 
impose on themselves to avoid procrastination even when missing them entails 
substantial costs (Thaler, 1980; Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002). Another one refers to 
smokers who prefer to purchase small and more expensive packs of cigarettes rather 
than cartons, so as to discourage themselves from smoking too much. Ausubel (1991) 
cites the anecdotal example of card holders who immerse their credit cards in 
trays of water and place them in the freezer, in an effort to avoid impulsive purchases.  
Unfortunately, serious self-control problems are difficult to observe under 
controlled conditions, and therefore controlled empirical evidence on self-rationing is 
only now beginning to emerge (see, Wertenbroch, 1998; Soman and Cheema, 2002). 
Finally, while it is obviously awkward to ask survey participants directly whether they 
have self-control problems, some survey questions hint at impulsive behavior and 
other such problems. For example, respondents are sometimes asked whether they 
find it difficult to plan ahead, or to control their purchases, or whether they smoke, or 
whether they find it acceptable to borrow in order to buy frivolous luxury items. Still, 
such variables are not many and their interpretation is not always straightforward. 
 
10.5.2.  Hyperbolic discounting and time inconsistency 
Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2003) study the co-existence of revolving 
credit card debt with substantial accumulation of assets for retirement in a calibrated 
model of a household with access to liquid and illiquid assets, and to borrowing 
through credit cards.
27  They show that a single rate of time preference cannot 28 
simultaneously match the level of accumulated assets upon transition to retirement 
and the observed level of revolving credit card debt at younger ages. Households 
appear to act impatiently with respect to short-term objectives facilitated by credit 
card borrowing, and much more patiently with respect to longer-term objectives 
regarding retirement planning. The authors propose hyperbolic discounting, under 
which the household should no longer be thought as a single entity, but as a sequence 
of temporally separated “selves” with possibly conflicting plans regarding future 
actions. When viewing two successive periods in the distant future, the two selves 
discount the second relative to the first differently. The current self is more patient 
with respect to longer run objectives than he is with respect to current objectives, and 
also more patient than what he knows his future self will be close to the relevant date. 
The current self tries to “tie the hands” of future selves and to force them to 
accumulate more than what they are likely to do on their own. The instrument of self-
control is irreversible investment in illiquid assets. The current self simultaneously 
borrows on the credit card to satisfy short-term objectives, and accumulates illiquid 
assets that the future self cannot liquidate to ensure that the household will have 
enough assets at retirement. Hence the observed co-existence of credit card debt and 
accumulation of retirement assets. 
As recognized by the authors, this elegant model of temporally separated 
selves cannot also account for the observed co-existence of high-interest credit card 
debt and low-interest liquid assets. Specifically, the model does not imply that the 
current self should ignore arbitrage opportunities regarding current assets and debts.  
We now turn to a different model that incorporates self-control considerations 
between contemporaneous selves. 
 
10.5.3.  Accountant-shopper households 
Bertaut and Haliassos (2002) propose an “accountant-shopper” model that can 
account for co-existence of high-interest credit card debt with substantial holdings of 
low-interest liquid assets. Haliassos and Reiter (2005) develop the underlying 
computational model of accountant and shopper interaction and show that the model 
can also account for observed co-existence of credit card debt with considerable 
accumulation of retirement assets, as well as for target utilization rates of credit card 29 
lines found by Gross and Souleles (2002a) and discussed above. This framework 
splits each household into two units, which can either represent two distinct partners 
or two selves. In the case of a single person, it is a model of self-control, while in the 
other case it should be thought of as a model of “partner-control”. In either case, it is a 
model of contemporaneous self-control, unlike hyperbolic discounting in which the 
current self builds up illiquid retirement assets to control future selves. The accountant 
decides the size of payment into the credit card account each month, as well as the 
overall household portfolio. The accountant is assumed to be fully rational and to 
solve a standard intertemporal expected utility maximization problem, taking into 
account all available information, the full implications of current actions for future 
outcomes, as well as the behavior of the shopper. The shopper goes to stores, with 
credit card in hand, and determines household consumption. The shopper’s self-
control problem is manifested in greater impatience compared to the accountant and 
in more limited understanding of the process governing future payments into the 
credit card account, which are ultimately influenced by the evolution of household 
assets and debts. Faced with uncertainty about future  payments, the shopper typically 
refrains from exhausting the entire credit card line but maintains a buffer, consistent 
with the Gross and Souleles (2002a) empirical finding of target utilization rates. Even 
under shopper behavior that is fully predictable by the accountant, it is optimal for the 
accountant to leave part of the credit card balance unpaid so as to restrain the shopper. 
In equilibrium, the accountant brings about the desired consumption level but pays the 
interest cost of self-control, namely the cost of not using low-interest assets to pay off 
high-interest debt.
28 
Since credit card debt is used as an instrument of self-control in addition to its 
traditional role of smoothing resources intertemporally, revolving debt does not 
conflict with holdings of either low-interest assets or retirement assets. Both types of 
assets are held for the usual precautionary and smoothing reasons associated with 
intertemporal maximization under uncertainty. Had the accountant decided to use 
some of these assets to lower the credit card balance, the shopper would have 
responded by charging more on the credit card, frustrating the accountant’s attempt. 
Finally, although the model does not invoke hyperbolic discounting and control of 
temporally separated selves to justify portfolio co-existence, it seems flexible enough 
to be combined with intertemporal self-control considerations, if this is desired.  30 
 
11. The choice between debit and credit cards 
As we saw in the data Section , debit cards are a more recent medium than 
credit cards, but their use is spreading fast, and they are overtaking credit cards as the 
most prevalent form of electronic payment at the point of sale. Part of the usual 
motivation for debit cards is that they limit the potential for overspending associated 
with credit cards. Debit card transactions can either be made online, using a PIN, or 
off-line using a signature and a process very similar to credit cards. Off-line debit 
transactions have been aided by the Visa and Mastercard logo, and it is not an 
exaggeration that debit and credit cards enjoy comparable levels of acceptability today. 
Use of debit cards is not allowed only for items such as car rentals and some on-line 
purchases over the internet. Moreover, debit and credit cards now offer essentially 
identical fraud protection (see also Zinman, 2004). A major advantage of debit cards 
is that they do not allow over-borrowing, as funds are immediately withdrawn from 
the account linked to the debit card (or withdrawn within three days in the case of off-
line purchases). Debit cards appear to be a natural way of solving self-control 
problems of relatively impatient and impulsive shoppers. It seems possible to impose 
discipline on a shopper by replacing the credit card with a debit card and limiting the 
funds available in the linked account. Indeed, observed usage of debit cards seems to 
reinforce this idea.
29 
Still, use of debit cards is not a costless way of coping with a self-control 
problem. Debit card users forego the free-float offered by credit cards, since funds are 
(almost) immediately withdrawn from the linked account. Interest costs are not 
limited to those implied by absence of free floating, but also include the cost of 
keeping available balances in low-interest linked checking accounts, instead of in 
higher-rate accounts and withdrawing funds only to cover the monthly payment on a 
credit card. This process can be quite complicated, especially if the debit card holder 
is not flush with liquid financial resources and tries to avoid overdraft costs and 
penalties associated with the linked account. Very often, credit card issuers offer 
additional rewards to credit card users but not to debit card users, such as frequent 
flier miles and other bonuses. Thus, using debit cards as instruments of self control is 
costly, although probably less so than revolving credit card debt to reduce the 
available credit line.
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Zinman (2004) questions the usual motivation for use of credit cards based on 
self-control considerations. He investigates whether choice of debit versus credit cards 
at the point of sale is in fact consistent with the relative cost of charging an extra 
dollar to the credit card relative to paying with the debit card. A key factor 
determining such relative costs is whether the consumer already revolves credit card 
debt, in which case new purchases cannot benefit from the grace period and are thus 
subject to high interest rates.  
Zinman formulates three testable hypotheses generated by a “canonical” 
model of consumer choice without self-control considerations. First, credit card debt 
revolvers should be more likely to use debit than those who do not, as they cannot 
take advantage of the grace period for new purchases. Second, revolvers who face 
binding credit constraints should be more likely to use debit than credit, e.g. because 
they are likely to be close to full utilization of the credit card line. Third, non-
revolving bank card holders should be less likely to use debit than those without 
bankcards. The main rationale for this third prediction is increased likelihood that card 
holders will want to take advantage of the free float. Using data from the 2001 and 
other Surveys of Consumer Finances, Zinman finds economically and statistically 
significant effects on debit use of revolving status and of credit limit constraints in 
particular, supporting mainly the first two predictions of the canonical model. 
However, these results and some stylized facts about debit card use may also 
be consistent with behavioral models. For example, results also seem consistent with 
the accountant-shopper model described above. Since credit card debt is revolved 
mainly as an instrument of self-control in that model, debt revolvers are more likely to 
exhibit self-control problems and to use debit cards as an additional measure to 
discipline impulsive shoppers. The same holds a fortiori for those with nearly binding 
credit card limits. To the extent that these arise from a desire to limit the resources 
available to the shopper, they will also be associated with a greater likelihood of 
encouraging the shopper to use a debit card for purchases. 
Zinman illustrates problems of distinguishing between standard and behavioral 
explanations of debit card use using the Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) model of 
mental accounting. In that model, the act of paying produces cognitive transactions 
costs and incentives to decouple payments from consumption. The optimal decoupling 
strategy tends to favor delayed payment for durables, but prepayment for 32 
instantaneous consumption. Credit cards serve as a decoupling device, because they 
delay payment and they also lump payments together. If there are convexities over 
losses associated with each distinct payment, both features attenuate “payment pain”. 
Debit provides relatively instantaneous payment and thus less decoupling than credit. 
This additional decoupling motive in credit versus debit card use could rationalize, for 
example, the finding of Reda (2003) that debit cards tend to be used for smaller 
transactions involving instantaneous consumption, while credit cards are used for 
larger transactions of more durable items.  
While it may be difficult to distinguish between traditional and behavioral 
models of credit versus debit card use by using solely data on choices at the point of 
sale, distinctions can be facilitated by reference to portfolios of credit card debt 
revolvers. Traditional models fail to explain co-existence of high-interest credit card 
debt with often substantial holdings of low-interest liquid assets.  The existence of 
such “arbitrage” opportunities goes against the logic of models that stress rational 
calculation of interest and other transactions costs: if consumers are so careful about 
comparing costs of using debit versus credit for each purchase, how do they miss the 
interest cost of not paying off their outstanding balances? And if debit card use is 
motivated by nearly binding credit card limits, how is it optimal to keep enough 
money in the low-interest linked account to finance purchases rather than using these 
funds to make more of the credit line available to the shopper and to take advantage of 
points, miles and other advantages of credit card purchases? All in all, it seems that 
the shortcomings of standard models become apparent when these models are 
confronted with portfolios of credit card revolvers rather than simply with the 
payment margin between credit and debit cards. 
 
12. Concluding remarks 
This paper documented trends in credit card and debit card access and usage in 
the United States using data from successive waves of the Survey of Consumer 
Finances between 1983 and 2001. We documented the spread of access and usage of 
such cards, examined trends exhibited by different demographic groups, and studied 
the widespread practice of revolving high-interest credit card debt. The general 
picture is one of spreading access and usage, but of a fairly stable proportion of bank 33 
card holders who revolve credit card debt. Debt revolvers tend to exhibit partial 
utilization of credit card lines, and they often combine credit card debt with 
substantial holdings of low-interest liquid assets and with accumulation of retirement 
assets. 
We then presented an overview of some of the most important recent 
theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of credit and debit card behavior. 
Drawing on recent research, we dismissed the possibility that there is widespread 
ignorance among credit card holders of the terms governing their credit cards, 
including annual percentage rates. Despite lack of ignorance, there is considerable 
evidence that credit card interest rates do not respond to competition in the credit card 
market. This arises because consumers tend to be unresponsive to changes in interest 
rates, probably as a result of search and switching cost.  
There is a rising trend in bankruptcy and delinquency in credit cards, partly 
attributable to an increased tendency of households to declare bankruptcy, controlling 
for the quality of the card holder pool and for supply-side factors. To the extent that 
bankruptcy is now more widespread, and presumably more socially acceptable, it can 
influence portfolio behavior. Strategic default motives may contribute to the observed 
co-existence of credit card debt with low-interest liquid assets, though we doubt that 
this mechanism alone is sufficient to account for the widespread incidence of the 
phenomenon. Recent research on the determinants of the level of credit card debt and 
of the extent of utilization of credit lines has found that credit line increases initiated 
by banks themselves do contribute to increases in the amount of debt revolved, such 
that credit line utilization returns in about 5 months or so to its rate prior to the line 
increase. Credit card debt revolvers appear to have target utilization rates of their 
credit lines, and it is possible to justify such “buffer-stock” behavior in the context of 
modern computational models of credit card behavior. 
Credit and debit cards provide a natural means of testing the relevance of 
emerging self-control models of consumer preferences. A considerable fraction of 
card holders believe that credit cards create problems of self-control, mainly because 
of the probability of overspending, at least by others if not by themselves. Debit cards 
are widely regarded as instruments for self-control that reduce this possibility. 
Although the choice of debit versus credit cards at the point of sale can be largely 
justified by the relative costs of these two modes of transacting, portfolio co-existence 34 
of credit card debt with liquid and with retirement assets seems to require departures 
from the standard framework. Hyperbolic discounting has been shown to account for 
the first type of co-existence. An alternative framework of “accountant-shopper” 
households, in which a fully rational accountant tries to control an impulsive shopper, 
has been shown to be consistent with both types of co-existence and with buffer-stock 
utilization behavior. 
Based on this survey of facts and of existing literature, we are led to the 
conclusion that credit cards provide a most fertile ground for analyzing consumption 
behavior, payment and repayment choice (including bankruptcy and delinquency), 
portfolio selection regarding both assets and debts, and the elusive nature of consumer 
preferences. 35 
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Table 1: Percentage of Households by Bank-Type Credit Card Payment Pattern 
  
        Among of those with a bank-type card:   
        No balance  No balance   
    Has any  Has Bank-  and no new  but has new  Carries  Hardly ever 
    credit card  Type card  charges  charges  balance  pays it off 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
              
 1983  65.4  43.0  18.3  30.5  51.1  43.9 
 1992  72.0  62.3  10.7  36.8  52.6  48.9 
 1995  74.6  66.5  7.3  36.7  56.0  47.3 
 1998  72.2  67.2  8.3  36.9  54.8  47.6 
 2001  76.2  72.6  7.2  39.4  53.4  45.9 
 1983             
by age:               
lt 35    57.2  34.0  14.9  24.5  60.6  49.2 
35-54   73.7  52.0  14.4  24.8  60.8  43.0 
55-64   75.0  53.1  21.0  35.6  43.4  42.4 
65 +    55.9  33.3  31.7  50.2  18.1  28.4 
by education               
less than high school  41.5  21.4  24.6  28.4  47.0  46.9 
high school    65.1  39.2  22.7  22.9  54.5  45.9 
some college    73.1  49.4  18.4  28.9  52.7  46.4 
college degree +    89.1  69.8  12.7  38.1  49.2  39.7 
by income               
lt $10,000    20.2  5.3  38.0  20.8  41.2  75.2 
10,000-24999   43.2  22.4  26.1  28.0  45.9 43.0 
25000-49999  70.8  41.3  19.8 25.2 55.0  46.8 
50000-99999  88.8  68.0  15.5 28.7 55.8  43.9 
100,000 +    97.2  83.4  15.0  49.5  35.5  32.4 
by marital status               
Unmarried   51.7  29.9  20.5  32.4  47.0  44.1 
married or partner    74.3  51.6  17.5  29.8  52.7  43.9 
by race               
white nonhispanic    70.3  46.8  19.3  32.5  48.2  42.4 
Black   41.9  23.3  12.1  13.9  73.9  54.1 
Hispanic   38.9  26.3  3.3  5.9  90.7  47.5 
Other   60.7  46.3  11.1  28.4  60.4  55.6 
 1992             
by age:               
lt 35    67.3  56.1  5.8  27.3  66.9  50.1 
35-54   74.9  67.2  7.0  33.6  59.4  51.2 
55-64   75.8  67.3  16.0  42.8  41.2  43.7 
65 +    70.1  57.9  20.1  49.9  30.0  41.9 
by education               
less than high school  39.6  27.5  22.5  28.0  49.6  70.7 
high school    69.2  56.5  12.1  29.2  58.7  53.5 
some college    78.9  70.0  10.2  33.5  56.3  37.1 
college degree +    91.5  85.6  7.6  44.8  47.6  47.3 
by income               
lt $10,000    28.5  18.9  23.1  25.0  51.9  70.4 
10,000-24999   60.6  47.4  18.1  31.1  50.8 54.0 
25000-49999  77.7  66.1  10.2 29.2 60.7  49.0 39 
50000-99999  91.0  84.3  6.9  38.1 54.9  47.9 
100,000 +    95.9  93.5  7.0  59.1  33.9  34.4 
by marital status               
Unmarried   58.7  49.0  13.1  35.5  51.4  50.7 
Married or partner    81.9  72.2  9.4  37.4  53.2  48.1 
by race               
white nonhispanic    78.9  69.7  10.8  39.4  49.8  47.6 
Black   47.0  35.5  9.6  13.1  77.4  47.7 
Hispanic   43.6  33.7  9.5  16.0  74.5  77.8 
Other   74.4  61.8  11.5  43.6  44.9  37.5 
 
 
by age: 
1995  
 
67.6 
 
 
58.8 
 
 
6.0 
 
 
25.2 
 
 
68.8 
 
 
49.5 
lt 35    78.2  71.9  5.1  28.7  66.2  46.5 
35-54   78.7  72.0  6.3  45.9  47.8  43.5 
55-64   73.4  62.0  13.9  60.6  25.6  49.9 
65 +               
by education    48.5  34.8  15.0  31.9  53.1  56.0 
less than high school    70.8  61.8  9.0  29.7  61.4  48.0 
high school    79.3  71.2  7.2  28.8  63.6  49.2 
some college    91.3  87.7  4.2  47.0  48.7  42.8 
college degree +               
by income    33.6  25.7  17.8  31.6  50.6  46.4 
lt $10,000    61.3  49.1  8.9  32.2  58.9  57.4 
10,000-24999   81.6  73.1  6.8  35.0  58.2 50.3 
25000-49999  95.3  90.0  6.6  34.3 59.1  42.2 
50000-99999  98.9  96.9  3.6  55.6 40.8  33.2 
100,000 +               
              
by marital status    63.2  54.8  8.6  35.6  55.9  51.1 
Unmarried   82.6  74.8  6.6  37.4  56.0  45.3 
married or partner               
              
by race    79.4  71.9  7.6  40.2  52.2  46.4 
white nonhispanic    51.7  41.0  6.2  12.2  81.5  54.5 
Black   60.1  49.7  4.0  10.2  85.7  51.4 
Hispanic   75.5  67.6  5.2  40.9  53.9  37.1 
Other              
 1998             
by age:    62.9  57.9  5.2  23.3  71.4  52.4 
lt 35    76.7  72.6  6.9  31.8  61.2  50.3 
35-54   79.6  75.4  9.0  41.4  49.6  38.7 
55-64   69.0  61.6  14.1  59.3  26.8  31.4 
65 +               
by education    42.5  34.7  14.8  26.0  59.2  53.7 
less than high school    68.9  62.8  10.9  31.9  57.1  51.8 
high school    76.6  73.3  7.4  29.0  63.5  50.1 
some college    91.6  88.2  5.4  46.4  48.2  41.0 
college degree +               
by income    29.4  23.5  8.6  29.7  61.7  51.1 
lt $10,000    54.8  47.7  14.1  30.4  55.4  44.4 
10,000-24999   77.0  71.0  9.4  32.8  57.8 52.6 
25000-49999  91.0  87.7  6.5  34.7 58.8  47.5 
50000-99999  98.9  98.0  3.6  59.1 37.3  35.3 
100,000 +               40 
by marital status    59.3  54.9  10.7  35.1  54.2  46.5 
Unmarried   81.5  76.1  7.0  37.8  55.1  48.1 
married or partner               
by race    77.9  73.5  8.2  39.8  52.0  46.5 
white nonhispanic    48.2  39.7  10.3  15.6  74.2  57.6 
Black   54.2  48.4  7.7  15.6  76.6  48.1 
Hispanic   66.5  60.2  5.9  43.7  50.5  40.7 
Other              
 41 
 
Table 2 Probit Estimation of Credit Card Ownership in the United States from the 1983, 
1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances 
Has at least one credit card    Has a bank-type credit card 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  Significance    Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  Significance 
Intercept -0.007  0.074  0.920    -0.136 0.072  0.059 
Married 0.412  0.036  <.0001    0.289 0.035 <.0001 
Single female  0.267  0.039  <.0001    0.154 0.038 <.0001 
Number of children  -0.039  0.009  <.0001    -0.036 0.009 <.0001 
Nonwhite/Hispanic -0.167  0.030  <.0001    -0.174 0.030 <.0001 
Age < 35  -0.210  0.038  <.0001    -0.153 0.036 <.0001 
Age 35-49  -0.120  0.037  0.001    -0.061 0.033  0.065 
Age 65-74  -0.022  0.047  0.641    -0.071 0.043  0.097 
Age 75+  -0.469  0.049  <.0001    -0.551 0.047 <.0001 
Less than HS diploma  -0.584  0.040  <.0001    -0.608 0.038 <.0001 
High School diploma or 
equiv. -0.257  0.035  <.0001    -0.261 0.033 <.0001 
College degree or higher  0.269  0.039  <.0001    0.237 0.035 <.0001 
Income < $10,000  -0.646  0.044  <.0001    -0.615 0.046 <.0001 
Income $10,000-$24,999  -0.293  0.033  <.0001    -0.237 0.032 <.0001 
Income $50,000-$99,9999  0.256  0.037  <.0001    0.263 0.033 <.0001 
Income $100,000 +  0.380  0.054  <.0001    0.357 0.044 <.0001 
ln (financial assets)  0.108  0.005  <.0001    0.116 0.005 <.0001 
Self employed  0.094  0.039  0.016    0.059 0.034  0.084 
Not currently working  -0.240  0.054  <.0001    -0.192 0.055  0.001 
Saver 0.056  0.027  0.036    0.028 0.025  0.252 
Liquidity constrained  -0.324  0.030  <.0001    -0.394 0.029 <.0001 
Has checking account  0.317  0.063  <.0001    0.313 0.075 <.0001 
d1983 -0.436  0.065  <.0001    -1.111 0.077 <.0001 
d1992 0.014  0.040  0.731    -0.209 0.037 <.0001 
d1995 0.088  0.039  0.026    -0.068 0.037  0.067 
d1998 -0.079  0.039  0.040    -0.114 0.037  0.002 
            
            
number of observations  21,055       21,055    
-2 log likelihood  13,706.625       15,772.164    42 
 
  3. Bank-type credit card and debit card use, by age,  
education, and income 
 
   1992, 1995, 1998, 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finance    
      Credit card  credit card, no  credit card, no    Both debit and  Both debit and 
    Debit card but but no debit  debit card, no  debit card, has  Both debit and  credit cards,  credit cards, has 
  Neither  no credit card  card  balance  balance  credit cards  no balance  balance 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
1992              
All 36.3  1.4  54.6  25.8  28.8  7.8  3.8  4.0 
by  age:              
lt 35  41.8  2.1  47.5  15.5  32.0  8.5  3.0  5.5 
35-54 31.0  1.8  57.6  23.1  34.5  9.7  4.2  5.5 
55-64 32.1  0.6  59.9  34.0  25.9  7.5  5.6  1.9 
65 +  41.7  0.5  54.3  37.6  16.7  3.5  2.9  0.6 
by  ed              
lt hs  72.5  0.0  26.5  13.3  13.2  1.0  0.6  0.4 
Hs 42.5  1.0  52.0  22.3  29.7  4.6  1.1  3.5 
some college  26.9  3.1  60.1  26.3  33.8  10.0  4.3  5.7 
college degree +  12.6  1.8  71.9  36.8  35.1  13.8  8.1  5.7 
by  inc              
lt $10,000  79.9  1.3  16.5  7.8  8.7  2.4  1.3  1.1 
10,000-24999 51.5  1.1  43.7  21.0  22.7 3.8  2.4  1.4 
25000-49999 32.5  1.4  59.5  24.0  35.5 6.6 2.0 4.6 
50000-99999 13.8  1.9  72.7  32.5  40.2 11.6  5.5 6.1 
100,000 +  5.1  1.4  74.8  50.4  24.4  18.7  11.4  7.3 
 
1995 
            
all 30.4  3.1  52.0  23.8  28.2  14.6  5.5  9.1 
by  age:              
lt 35  35.5  5.7  40.8  13.4  27.4  18.0  5.0  13.0 
35-54 24.7  3.4  55.1  18.7  36.4  16.8  5.6  11.2 
55-64 26.5  1.5  60.0  32.1  27.9  12.0  5.4  6.6 
65 +  37.4  0.6  54.2  40.4  13.8  7.7  5.7  2.0 
by  ed              
lt hs  61.8  3.4  30.0  14.6  15.4  4.9  1.8  3.1 
hs 35.4  2.9  51.3  20.4  30.9  10.5  3.5  7.0 
some college  24.6  4.1  53.8  20.6  33.2  17.5  5.1  12.4 
college degree +  9.8  2.5  65.0  35.0  30.0  22.8  10.0  12.8 
by  inc              
lt $10,000  71.7  2.7  22.5  12.1  10.4  3.2  0.6  2.6 
10,000-24999 48.0  2.9  40.6  16.9  23.7 8.5  3.3  5.2 
25000-49999 22.7  4.3  57.3  25.6  31.7 15.8  5.0 10.8 
50000-99999 6.7  3.3  67.2  28.4  38.8 22.9  8.5 14.4 
100,000 +  2.9  0.2  73.5  44.4  29.1  23.5  13.0  10.5 
 
1998 
                
all   25.7  7.2  40.7  20.8  19.9  26.5  9.6  16.9 
by age:                   
lt 35    30.5  11.6  23.9  7.7  16.2  33.9  8.8  25.1 
35-54   20.4  6.9 41.8  17.5 24.3  30.8 10.6  20.2 
55-64   18.1  6.5 52.6  27.6 25.0  22.8 10.4  12.4 
65 +    35.3  3.2  49.7  37.5  12.2  11.9  7.7  4.2 
by ed                   
lt hs    58.1  7.2  25.3  11.2  14.1  9.3  2.9  6.4 
hs   27.6  9.6  41.6  20.1  21.5  21.2  6.8  14.4 
some college  17.8  8.9  42.0  18.3  23.7  31.4  8.5  22.9 
college degree +  7.7  4.1  49.1  29.0  20.1  39.2  16.8  22.4 
by inc                   
lt $10,000    68.4  8.1  15.4  6.5  8.9  8.1  2.5  5.6 
10,000-24999 43.3  9.1 32.6  15.9 16.7 14.9 5.3  9.6 
25000-49999 20.1  9.0 45.4  21.5  23.9 25.5  8.4 17.1 
50000-99999 6.7  5.7 47.4  22.7  24.7 40.3  13.4  26.9 
100,000 +    1.2  0.8  57.1  41.0  16.1  41.0  20.5  20.5 
2001                  
all   18.2  9.2  33.8  18.9  14.9  38.8  15.9  22.9 
by age:                   
lt 35    20.8  15.1  17.4  6.1  11.3  46.7  14.3  32.4 
35-54   12.0  9.7 34.3  15.3 19.0  44.1 16.3  27.8 43 
55-64   17.3  6.6 42.0  23.8 18.2  34.1 15.6  18.5 
65 +    28.5  3.4  50.4  37.0  13.4  17.7  12.5  5.2 
by ed                   
lt hs    43.6  14.9  24.6  12.0  12.6  16.8  6.0  10.8 
hs   20.8  9.0  37.3  16.6  20.7  32.9  9.9  23.0 
some college  11.5  10.0  34.0  15.3  18.7  44.6  15.2  29.4 
college degree +  4.4  5.4  39.5  26.9  12.6  50.8  24.3  26.5 
by inc                   
lt $10,000    59.1  12.5  20.6  7.1  13.5  7.8  2.1  5.7 
10,000-24999 32.1  14.2  30.7  15.7 15.0 23.1 8.0  15.1 
25000-49999 13.0  10.4  38.0  18.9  19.1 38.6  10.7  27.9 
50000-99999 6.1  6.2 36.1  19.0  17.1 51.6  21.8  29.8 
100,000 +    1.8  2.5  42.3  31.7  10.6  53.5  29.7  23.8 
                  
 
Variable definitions: 
debit card: in 1992; household owns a debit card. In 1995, 1998, and 2001: households uses a debit card. 
has a balance: in all years, household has a bank-type credit card and had remaining balance after last bill was 
paid. 
hs=high school, lt hs= did not finish high school.44 
 
Table 4:  Probit Estimation of Debit Card Use in the United States 
from the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances 
  Uses a debit card* 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error  Significance 
Intercept -0.739  0.078  <.0001 
Married 0.037  0.037  0.318 
Single female  0.037  0.042  0.388 
Number of children  -0.012  0.011  0.290 
Nonwhite/Hispanic -0.008  0.032  0.806 
Age < 35  0.510  0.037  <.0001 
Age 35-49  0.307  0.031  <.0001 
Age 65-74  -0.209  0.042  <.0001 
Age 75+  -0.658  0.056  <.0001 
Less than HS diploma  -0.327  0.046  <.0001 
High School diploma or equiv.  -0.229  0.036  <.0001 
College degree or higher  0.001  0.032  0.983 
Income < $10,000  -0.346  0.057  <.0001 
Income $10,000-$24,999  -0.149  0.040  0.000 
Income $50,000-$99,9999  0.127  0.035  0.000 
Income $100,000 +  0.036  0.041  0.382 
ln J20(financial assets)  0.017  0.005  0.001 
Self employed  -0.240  0.029  <.0001 
Not currently working  -0.130  0.058  0.024 
Saver 0.462  0.034  <.0001 
Liquidity constrained  -0.042  0.026  0.113 
Has checking account  0.213  0.031  <.0001 
Buying on credit usually bad idea  0.083  0.024  0.001 
d1983 -1.155  0.035  <.0001 
d1992 -0.843  0.031  <.0001 
d1995 -0.357  0.029  <.0001 
d1998 -0.079  0.039  0.040 
      
* for 1992, dependent variable is debit card ownership 
number of observations  16,952    
-2 log likelihood  16,470.584    45 
 
 
Table 5: Percentage of Liquidity Constrained Households, by Bank-Type Credit Card Payment Pattern 
1983, 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances       
        
  1983 1992 1995 1998  2001 
        
Percent with no bank-type credit card  57.0  37.7  33.5  32.8  27.4 
of which: percent liquidity constrained  27.9  34.0  39.3  34.0  34.3 
of which: percent liquidity constrained for credit other than 
credit card 
  25.6 30.6 27.2  27.3 
        
Percent with bank-type credit card  43.0  62.3  66.5  67.2  72.6 
of which: percent liquidity constrained  12.4  14.8  15.0  16.9  17.0 
of which: percent liquidity constrained for credit other than 
credit card 
  10.0 10.1 10.5  11.2 
        
Percent that has Bank-Type Card but no balance and no 
new charges: 
18.3 10.7 7.3  8.3  7.2 
of which: percent liquidity constrained  6.9  9.7  10.7  8.8  7.5 
of which: percent liquidity constrained for credit other than 
credit card 
  6.6 8.2 6.6  6.7 
        
Percent that has Bank-Type Card; no balance but has new 
charges 
30.5 36.8 36.7 36.9  39.4 
of which: percent liquidity constrained  4.4  5.2  5.6  6.1  6.4 
of which: percent liquidity constrained for credit other than 
credit card 
  3.4 3.9 3.9  4.3 
        
Percent with Bank-Type Card; balance but at least 
sometimes pays balance in full 
56.1 51.1 52.7 52.4  54.1 
of which: percent liquidity constrained  10.3  17.7  14.7  18.0  18.5 
of which: percent liquidity constrained for credit other than 
credit card 
  11.5 10.1 11.7  13.6 
        
Percent with Bank-Type Card; balance and hardly ever 
pays balance in full 
43.9 48.9 47.3 47.6  45.9 
of which: percent liquidity constrained  16.0  27.5  29.7  33.6  35.2 
of which: percent liquidity constrained for credit other than 
credit card 
  19.0 19.3 19.9  20.7 46 
Table 6: Credit card limits and interest rates charged on card with the highest balance 
   1995, 1998, 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finance    
   All Figures in 2001 Dollars   
  
  
No balance and no 
new Charges 
No balance but has 
new charges 
Carries balance and at least 
sometimes pays it off in full 
Carries balance and hardly ever pays it 
off 
          Median       Median      
  
  
  
credit limit 
on 
bank-type 
credit 
Cards 
interest 
rate 
credit limit
on bank-
type 
credit cards
interest
rate 
balance 
on 
bank-type
cards 
credit limit 
on 
bank-type 
credit 
cards 
interes
t 
rate 
card 
utlizatio
n 
rate 
balance 
on bank-
type 
cards 
credit limit 
on 
bank-type 
credit cards 
interest 
rate 
card 
utlization 
rate 
  1995 6,679  15.0  13,359  16.0  1,162 13,359  14.0  15.1  2,905 9,351 15.0  38.3 
  1998 7,620  14.0  10,885  15.0  1,087 10,885  14.8  19.8  3,260 8,708 16.0  50.6 
  2001 7,500  16.0  15,000  15.0  1,000 10,000  13.0  17.5  2,800 7,500 16.0  50.0 
  1995                    
by  age:                    
less than 35    2,672  14.0  10,153  15.3  1,045  9,351  14.8  15.9  2,903  6,679  14.0  44.4 
35-54    6,679  13.9 13,359 16.0 1,510 13,359 14.0 17.4 3,136 10,153 16.0  39.8 
55-64    6,679  14.0  13,359  15.0  1,742 13,359  13.5  15.4  2,671 8,015 14.7  35.3 
65  +    6,679  16.0  12,023  17.0 325  12,023  14.4 6.7 1,161 9,351 15.9  16.8 
                       
by  education:                       
less than high school  6,679  15.0  8,015  17.0  592  11,622  15.9  10.9  1,510  6,679  15.0  27.3 
high  school   6,011  15.0  10,019  16.9  1,045 9,351 14.0  17.4  2,439 7,080 16.0  39.8 
some  college    6,679  14.5  12,824  16.9  1,161 13,359  14.5  14.5  2,323 9,351 14.0  43.6 
college degree +  6,679  14.5  14,694  16.5  1,510  16,030  14.0  14.6  3,252  13,359  15.0  36.9 
                       
by  income:                       
lt  $10,000    3,473  15.0 6,679 18.0 290  8,015 13.9 9.9 1,743 6,679 15.9  57.8 
$10,000-$24,999  4,008  17.0 9,351 17.9 813  7,247 16.5  20.6  2,208 6,679 16.0  46.9 
$2,5000-$49,999  6,679  14.5  11,355  16.9  1,278 11,622  14.0  17.4  2,324 6,679 15.0  41.7 
$50,000-$99,999  6,679  14.5 13,349 14.0 1,278 14,695 14.0 12.7 3,486 12,023 14.7  30.2 
$100,000  +    6,679  12.0 21,379 16.5 2,324 26,717 14.0 16.8 6,043 26,717 15.0  37.3 
                       
  1998                    
by  age:                    
less than 35    3,810  12.9  10,885  14.0  1,042  6,531  15.0  28.9  2,498  5,769  16.0  60.9 
35-54    9,361  13.5 16,328 14.9 1,194 10,885 14.0 18.6 3,258 10,885 15.9  45.4 
55-64    10,885  14.0 13,062 14.9 1,086 14,151 15.0 14.4 3,801 10,885 18.0  57.7 
65  +    6,531  15.0 10,885 15.0  869  8,164 15.0 14.4 1,629 10,885 15.7  38.9 
                       
by  education:                       
less than high school  5,443  15.0  10,885  15.0  760  6,096  17.0  30.4  2,172  4,898  18.0  56.9 
high  school   7,293  13.0 8,708 15.0 869  8,164 15.0  17.6  2,715 7,946 16.0  46.8 
some  college    10,885 14.9  10,885  14.0  1,194 8,708 14.5  24.9  3,475 7,620 17.0  47.4 
college degree +  10,885  14.0  16,328  15.0  1,303  13,062  14.0  16.1  4,778  10,885  15.0  53.3 
                       
by  income:                       
lt  $10,000    2,286  12.0 5,443 14.0 554  5,443 15.0  29.9  2,390 2,939 18.0  66.5 
$10,000-$24,999  5,443  15.9 9,797 15.1 652  5,443 15.0  23.2  1,630 4,898 18.0  53.3 
$2,5000-$49,999  7,620  12.5  10,885  15.0  1,087 8,164 14.5  22.4  3,260 7,620 16.9  50.9 
$50,000-$99,999  13,062  14.0 13,062 14.8 1,087 11,974 14.0 15.4 3,803 11,974 14.0  44.5 
$100,000  +    10,855  13.0 21,770 15.0 2,173 20,682 14.0 20.0 5,433 16,328 15.9  51.9 
                       
  2001                    
by  age:                    
less than 35    5,000  14.9  10,000  14.0  1,000  7,000  14.0  31.0  3,000  6,000  16.0  65.5 
35-54    8,700  14.0  15,000  15.0  1,200 13,000  13.0  17.3  3,000 8,000 16.0  47.8 
55-64    9,600  17.0  20,000  15.6  1,000 10,000  12.0  11.5  3,000 8,000 18.0  48.5 
65  +    8,000  17.0  15,000  16.0 600  10,000  14.9 8.8 1,500 9,000 14.9  35.4 
                       
by  education:                       
less than high school  6,000  16.3  10,000  16.7  500  5,500  15.0  20.8  1,200  5,000  17.0  47.0 
high  school   7,700  16.0  10,000  16.0 900  10,000  14.0  15.5  2,000 6,000 16.9  53.0 
some  college    5,000  14.9  10,000  14.9  1,000 10,000  13.5  23.3  3,000 7,500 17.0  59.1 
college degree +  7,500  15.0  20,000  15.5  1,500  15,000  12.5  16.4  4,000  11,000  14.0  49.5 
                       
by  income:                       
lt  $10,000    8,500  15.0 5,000 15.0 710  2,500 18.0  40.0  1,000 2,500 18.9  50.0 
$10,000-$24,999  5,000  17.0 6,500 17.0 500  5,000 14.5  21.2  1,800 4,500 16.0  60.0 
$2,5000-$49,999  5,800  15.0  11,000  15.0 800  9,000 14.9  20.0  2,700 6,000 16.9  60.0 
$50,000-$99,999  7,700  17.0 15,000 14.0 1,500 15,000 11.0 14.7 4,000 12,000 14.0  50.0 
$100,000  +    20,000  14.0 25,000 16.7 2,300 20,000 13.0 17.0 4,000 15,000 15.0  31.9 47 
Table 7 Median Liquid Assets, Total Financial Assets, and Bank-Type Credit Card Balances of U.S. Households by Credit Card Payment Patterns 
                                        
         1983, 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finance            
               All Figures in 2001 
Dollars 
                  
                      
         Card holders with no balance  Cardholders who carry balance but 
  Non-card holders  and no new charges  but made new 
charges 
  "almost always" or "sometimes" pay 
off in full 
hardly ever pay off in full 
   Total 
Liquid 
Assets 
Total 
Financial 
Assets 
Net 
Worth 
 
 
Total
liquid
assets
Total 
Financial
assets 
Net 
Worth 
Total 
Liquid 
Assets 
Total 
Financial 
Assets 
Net 
Worth
Median 
balance on 
bank type 
cards 
Total 
Liquid 
Assets 
Total 
Financial 
Assets 
Net 
Worth 
Median 
balance 
on  
bank-type 
cards 
Total 
Liquid
Assets
Total 
Financial 
Assets 
Net 
Worth` 
 1983  889  2,488  27,929  7,247  23,902  133,136  12,706  54,941  214,701 711  3,821  15,994  101,096  1,244  2,133  8,928  56,782 
 1992  252  884  13,330  3,787  25,246  133,425  11,108  76,407  220,524 800  3,042  18,871  95,910  1,800  1,515  7,485  43,297 
 1995  277  1,158  15,603  3,699  22,538  111,246  8,668  73,393  211,280 1,162  2,427  21,960  80,079  2,905  1,618  10,460  48,763 
 1998  435  1,401  13,661  4,278  33,961  117,776  10,885  96,223  244,477 1,087  4,071  30,478  97,682  3,260  2,177  14,151  42,452 
 2001  400  1,300  12,200  5,000  25,400  116,000  13,020  125,300  319,250 1,000  4,000  32,500  101,260  2,800  1,500  8,550  39,430 
                                    
 1983                                   
by age:                                     
lt  35    480  968 6,140  5,247  10,766  29,850  5,420 15,822  48,915 533  2,133  7,508  44,108  1,066 1,777 6,131 34,510 
35-54   967  3,199  48,506  7,002  20,081  138,611  12,440  50,114  217,342 711  4,414  21,325  114,543  1,244  3,021  10,041  75,177 
55-64   2,388  6,719  71,448  7,642  43,786  184,441  17,327  114,737  300,742 711  3,821  22,392  156,627  889  1,422  9,392  106,507
65 +    1,777  7,748  62,035  11,995 57,756  187,007  19,193  115,898  301,790 576  5,198  34,241  110,534  970  613  613  53,578 
by education                                     
less than high school  467  1,155  22,082  3,554  12,316  101,270  7,338  31,878  139,574 533  1,822  5,893  100,956  1,066  1,066  6,780  39,461 
high  school    1,022 3,554  32,119  6,398  23,902  128,858  8,886 32,992  189,262 551  3,243  9,774  78,070  1,155 1,654 8,379 60,750 
some college    1,066  2,844  17,423  8,352  22,557  119,011  11,516  52,139  210,879 711  4,002  26,577  123,186  1,422  2,088  5,047  53,594 
college degree +    2,799  8,886  57,228  10,307 38,422  154,125  18,660  80,503  272,114 800  6,131  23,509  117,806  1,244  3,465  11,409  67,278 
by income                                     
lt $10,000    44  203  3,643  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
10,000-24999    467  1,066  10,570  3,879  8,823 86,165  3,865 19,815  87,098 622  1,550  4,883  38,604  889  613  1,955 22,658 
25000-49999   1,422 3,764  35,761  7,528  22,557  93,280  7,286 23,328  120,978 800  2,342  8,352  71,536  1,244 1,599 5,278 41,501 
50000-99999   3,377 19,255  111,089  8,175  27,719  138,220  13,506  57,223  196,465 889  4,530  23,591  117,806  1,066 2,843 12,664  81,864 
100,000 +    20,661  106,760  345,287 38,826 159,531  382,833  34,654  267,458  850,652 800  14,750  57,409  324,230  4,442  8,886  26,138  115,208
                                    
 1992                                   
by age:                                     
lt  35    88  379 2,714  3,534  9,846 33,200  5,239 23,416  66,662 1,010  2,121  5,491  24,668  1,389 1,250 3,724 12,232 
35-54   189  732  11,234  3,534  22,216  112,850  10,565  92,779  236,138 1,010  4,418  25,498  109,631  2,525  1,856  10,351  64,125 
55-64   252  884  27,543  2,525  31,558  167,255  13,822  131,910  332,237 884  3,320  63,999  181,064  2,525  2,272  10,351  95,938 
65 +    1,262  4,418  53,080  5,302  34,208  148,825  15,148  94,420  268,807 884  3,282  19,793  138,790  1,641  947  2,525  64,213 
by education                                     
less than high school  126  265  10,704  2,146  13,254  89,245  6,943  40,520  164,478 1,262  1,389  11,840  108,659  1,262  568  1,262  44,054 
high  school    379  1,010  12,143  4,166  21,068  134,877  9,467 61,348  200,581 631  2,525  15,148  83,249  2,020 1,452 6,059 35,269 
some college    417  1,893  16,284  3,030  19,882  103,698  10,730  81,671  235,545 884  2,777  13,254  88,614  1,893  1,553  6,690  39,384 
college degree +    985  4,355  31,558  5,807  35,445  151,615  11,992  93,789  247,663 1,010  4,166  28,528  108,798  3,157  2,146  11,361  58,482 
by income                                     
lt $10,000    13  126  1,893  947  4,671  38,412  2,777  17,925  23,605 1,010  631  3,408  54,001  1,010  454  871  16,991 
10,000-24999    153  631 10,843  3,787  15,021  103,130  4,393 21,459  89,484 947  1,264  4,418  35,029  1,262  619  2,083 32,264 
25000-49999   631  2,903  23,100  3,661  22,216  133,425  7,952 54,304  179,499 757  2,272  11,752  74,072  1,893 1,262 5,945 30,030 
50000-99999   2,146 13,393  70,891  6,690  39,131  138,853  10,730  72,230  210,388 1,010  3,787  25,498  108,621  2,651 2,651 13,393  71,875 
100,000 +    12,623  30,926  177,984  7,826  96,541  257,295  27,771  266,598  746,273 1,262  16,284  81,545  280,736  5,049  11,234 56,804  206,10849 
    Table 7 Median Liquid Assets, Total Financial Assets, and Bank-Type Credit Card Balances of U.S. Households by Credit Card 
Payment Patterns 
(cont'd)   
                                  
             1983, 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finance             
                 All Figures in 2001 Dollars                  
                   
          
   Non-card holders 
Card holders with no balance 
and no new charges 
Card holders with no balance 
but made new charges 
Cardholders who carry balance but 
"almost always" or "sometimes" pay 
off in full 
Cardholders who carry balance but 
hardly ever pay off in full 
                   Median       Median      
   Total  Total    Total Total    Total Total    balance on  Total  Total    balance on Total  Total   
   liquid  Financial Net  liquid  Financial Net liquid  Financial Net  bank-type liquid  Financial Net  bank-type liquid Financial Net 
   assets  assets  Worth  assets assets Worth assets assets  Worth  cards  assets assets Worth  cards  assets assets  Worth 
                            
  1995                           
b y   a g e :                             
lt  35    58  474  4,843 1,040 8,356 30,282 4,623  23,347  59,177  1,045 1,618  8,830  31,785  2,903  1,214  5,005  11,523 
35-54    231  1,791 17,164 4,392 27,369  128,063 8,091 78,363  211,280  1,510 3,340  31,345  119,105  3,136 1,734  12,251  64,089 
55-64    347  705  26,237 9,246 41,840  150,138 9,246  123,566  319,579  1,742 2,543  24,561  142,367  2,671 1,502  13,349  77,670 
65  +    925  2,196  55,733  5,548 23,232 131,414 12,483 86,801  251,502  325  4,623  36,754  123,416 1,161  1,849 10,749  79,866 
by  education                            
less than high school  59  347  12,275  4,623  21,036  121,914  4,623  21,960  134,951  592  2,312  11,015  87,517  1,510  982  3,814  36,662 
high  school    347  1,422 18,493 2,485 22,885  110,541 6,935 61,489  193,193  1,045 1,734  14,898  92,741 2,439 1,156 6,785  43,805 
some  college    254  1,156  9,189  4,276 27,369  102,404 8,669 64,759  205,964  1,161 2,312  18,435  83,911 2,323 1,803 9,709  41,678 
college  degree  +    1,156  7,513  31,022  3,999 23,116 103,213 10,402  108,622  255,432  1,734  3,571  31,149  90,233 3,252  2,219 19,140  58,368 
by  income                            
lt  $10,000    0  69  2,520 2,312 8,091 76,664 1,734 7,166  20,920  290  1,040  3,930  29,253  1,743 566 1,075  4,300 
10,000-24999    347  1,156 13,338 3,467 14,101  102,404 3,930 23,232  111,766  813  1,248  4,219  48,312 2,208  647  2,890  33,981 
25000-49999    578  3,467 26,930 2,890 34,443  131,414 6,588 54,091  185,275  1,278 1,907  18,493  67,984 2,324 1,271 8,322  35,830 
50000-99999    2,219  18,527 59,061  3,699 21,960 110,541 11,026 95,931  244,452  1,278  3,363  37,564  113,731 3,486  2,658 21,209  61,812 
100,000  +    5,652  34,096 112,979 22,307 96,278 415,048 26,583 310,332  724,455  2,324  10,402  85,529  268,550 6,043  6,184 58,541  169,336 
  1998                           
b y   a g e :                             
lt  35    174  620  3,374  2,286 12,344 29,368  4,354 23,610  54,654  1,042 2,395  8,545  31,828 2,498 1,252 4,572  8,675 
35-54    327  1,306  15,587  6,313 35,071 117,231 10,885 93,938  258,519  1,194  4,898  38,206  118,973 3,258  2,286 23,839  66,594 
55-64    631  2,057  28,911  6,531 64,222 139,219 13,062  138,240  316,862  1,086  5,225  47,415  148,744 3,801  3,048 23,457  74,203 
65  +    1,306  5,029  72,930  4,354 34,832 146,948 12,953  130,337  278,656  869  3,472  24,165  114,510 1,629  2,068 9,579  85,382 
by  education                            
less than high school  109  490  8,708  2,286  30,228  91,358  7,837  40,819  152,259  760  1,850  6,967  67,552  2,172  1,089  11,974  31,817 
high  school    545  2,188 16,491 2,634 13,269  111,125 9,361 83,325  206,869  869  2,482  21,389  78,274 2,715 1,742 9,426  43,257 
some  college    653  1,961 13,693  10,493  37,009  134,854 9,034 72,385  214,761  1,194 4,354  30,478  97,040 3,475 2,068  13,334  41,766 
college  degree  +    1,089 10,450 46,098 6,096 85,121 187,331 12,300  141,505  294,004  1,303  5,987  53,337  125,221  4,778 3,113  25,374 50,561 
by  income                            
lt  $10,000    1  131  1,959  762  1,056 91,358 2,504 8,708  92,991  554  1,143  2,612  21,639  2,390 218  958  8,588 
10,000-24999    327  795  6,640  2,286 15,892 80,549  3,461 40,819  152,259  652  1,089  2,743  30,707 1,630 1,034 1,948  11,135 
25000-49999    980  5,660 29,477 4,191 29,934  100,501 8,817 42,854  173,126  1,087 2,504  19,038  79,069 3,260 1,306 9,165  28,192 
50000-99999    1,959 16,437 58,942 8,164 47,132 176,555 11,429  114,510  265,812  1,087  5,606  53,380  142,463  3,803 3,277  31,131  76,739 
100,000  +    12,572 291,577 378,852 17,971 174,444 279,702  27,212 350,323  756,834  2,173  12,017  124,415  287,689 5,433  6,966 115,381 204,856 
  2001                           
b y   a g e :                             
lt  35    150  500  4,140  2,700 10,900 78,030  6,000 32,505  69,550  1,000 2,190  7,590  19,390 3,000 1,420 4,350  7,700 
35-54    300  1,200  10,430  4,000 22,700 155,600 12,700  114,500  297,000  1,200  4,350  45,500  133,100 3,000  2,000 13,320  53,620 
55-64    560  2,000  40,800  8,000 40,000 174,900 17,000  283,300  542,002  1,000  5,360  40,740  177,379 3,000  1,500 13,150  76,580 
65  +    1,500  4,400  66,000 10,901 25,400 114,840 17,200  179,600  405,300  600  7,500  26,700  147,700 1,500  1,110 4,150  74,000 
by  education                            
less than high school  100  300  8,400  4,500  17,500  112,500  11,100  46,000  196,820  500  2,000  9,000  59,200  1,200  1,000  2,800  23,110 
high  school    500  1,400 15,100 6,000 22,000 90,700  7,000 69,700  197,800  900  3,000  23,330  87,800 2,000 1,200 6,800  34,800 
some  college    660  2,300  10,250 4,000 22,700 155,600 12,400  122,000  304,600  1,000  3,700  19,320  71,070 3,000 1,520 9,200  34,050 
college  degree  +    1,600 12,670 41,500 8,000 43,900 179,000 17,200  218,300  465,300  1,500  5,820  60,950  178,001  4,000 2,400  22,460 69,500 
by  income                            
lt  $10,000    10  40  1,600 1,100 1,110 60,390 2,000  14,540  67,000  710  645 800  14,900  1,000 250  650  6,300 
10,000-24999   230  700  7,800 3,400  10,901  79,190 4,400  37,900  137,400  500  1,500  4,500  41,280  1,800 720 1,400  9,975 
25000-49999    1,000  4,610 23,300 7,000 31,000  110,600 7,300 63,820  197,420  800  2,500  13,650  49,700 2,700 1,400 6,590  24,100 
50000-99999    1,600 15,000 70,750 6,200 32,400 193,400 12,200  118,900  304,100  1,500  5,500  49,000  130,000  4,000 2,950  29,000  74,240 
100,000  +    4,950  98,200 249,100 21,100 127,420 467,270  38,500 452,200  980,500  2,300  10,300  148,300  382,129 4,000  6,430 79,300  189,700 49
Table 8: Median Liquid Assets, Total Financial Assets, and Bank-Type Credit Card Balances of U.S. 
Households that Carried a Credit Card Balance, by High Liquid Asset Holding 
   1995, 1998, and 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances        
       All Figures in 2001 Dollars          
  Households with Bank-type Card Balance Greater than Liquid  Households with Liquid Assets Greater than Bank-type Card Balance (and at 
    Assets      least $1,000 and at least one-half monthly income)   
                      
   Median          Median        percent  that 
  Percent of  balance on    Total    Percent of  balance on    Total    "hardly ever 
  card-holders  bank-type  Liquid  financial  Total net  card-holders  bank-type  Liquid  financial  Total net  pay off" in 
  with balance  cards  assets  assets  worth  with balance  cards  assets  assets  worth  full 
1995  61.0  2,440  982 7,478  48,140  39.0  1,162  6,588  36,986  104,854 35.5 
1998  53.0  3,260 1,089  10,341  38,391  47.0  1,087 7,837  37,009  107,587  33.8 
2001  55.5  2,500 1,000  6,100  36,295  44.5  1,000 8,000  40,710  127,400  30.8 
1995                    
by  age:                    
less than 35  67.7  2,324  867  3,699  12,367  32.3  1,081  4,635  18,435  45,423  35.5 
35-54  60.3  3,138 1,156  11,292  68,851  39.7  1,394 7,975  42,649  123,093  34.9 
55-64  58.2  2,324  809 7,165  88,176  41.8  1,743  6,993  44,787  159,385 35.8 
65  +  48.2  1,162 670  5,779  79,866  51.8  383 6,599  49,410  137,829  36.1 
                    
by  education:                    
less than high school  60.2  1,743  462  1,676  22,249  39.8  825  3,930  13,292  87,517  43.3 
high  school  67.3  2,092  751 5,328  45,585  32.7  1,162  6,761  37,564  113,765 31.1 
some college  60.5  2,324  982  6,704  40,834  39.5  1,046  5,779  36,986  95,226  41.1 
college degree +  55.6  3,486  1,387  16,990  60,471  44.4  1,511  8,091  42,996  119,510  31.2 
                    
by  income:                    
lt  $10,000  70.2  1,511 347  774  6,068  29.8  151 3,583  8,333  27,589  30.2 
$10,000-$24,999  67.2  2,092 462  1,167  15,846  32.8  709 4,276  13,292  80,328  38.8 
$2,5000-$49,999 63.8  2,557  925  7,166  36,489  36.2  1,162  4,623  24,561  83,067  37.7 
$50,000-$99,999  57.4  3,138 1,503  16,644  72,550  42.6  1,511 7,859  51,433  134,951  34.7 
$100,000 +  45.0  5,810  3,514  47,041  169,336  55.0  2,440  21,960  134,304  337,378  23.4 
                    
1998                    
by  age:                    
less than 35  41.7  2,608  1,001  3,314  8,675  58.3  1,087  4,441  11,538  31,512  40.1 
35-54  38.0  3,803 1,306  18,221  51,160  62.0  1,304 8,817  57,146  127,790  36.6 
55-64  33.1  3,803 1,393  15,326  94,808  66.9  1,195 8,599  72,821  192,621  24.3 
65  +  21.0  3,368 577  2,112  64,232  79.0  760 6,749  35,921  130,903  21.0 
                    
by  education:                    
less than high school  61.8  2,282  435  2,112  31,022  38.2  761  5,443  22,314  98,455  41.7 
high school  56.8  3,260  1,089  66,966  39,077  43.2  761  4,844  27,757  96,267  36.3 
some  college  53.9  3,477 1,143  12,137  34,299  46.1  1,195 7,717  37,009  104,768  34.8 
college degree +  46.9  4,781  1,524  20,028  47,676  53.1  1,521  9,666  63,133  125,221  29.1 
                    
by  income:                    
lt  $10,000  72.3  1,956 218  675  9,285  27.7  272 2,558  5,769  15,402  16.5 
$10,000-$24,999  57.1  1,956 381  925  5,693  42.9  652 3,048  9,579  48,003  34.7 
$2,5000-$49,999 57.4  3,585  925  6,390  30,141  42.6  1,087  5,769  23,457  81,692  36.9 
$50,000-$99,999  48.1  4,346 2,068  26,668  67,106  51.9  1,304 9,002  61,609  150,344  34.3 
$100,000 +  40.7  6,084  4,572  90,346  208,557  59.3  2,173  17,416  155,797  303,006  24.7 
                    
2001                    
by  age:                    
less than 35  66.6  2,500  950  2,850  7,180  33.4  1,000  5,000  19,420  38,350  35.5 
35-54  55.5  2,600 1,200  11,500  53,960  44.5  1,500 8,000  52,400  146,800  31.2 
55-64  44.1  3,080  600 6,100  43,260  55.9  1,200 10,000  75,720  196,730 30.2 
65  +  41.4  2,000 900  1,880  76,500  58.6  400 8,000  37,550  147,700  22.8 
                    
by  education:                    
less than high school  60.6  1,000  500  1,100  17,350  39.4  700  4,600  12,300  80,750  14.7 
high  school  60.0  2,000 910  5,030  36,800  40.0  700 7,100  33,630  96,720  28.8 
some college  59.7  2,900  1,000  5,750  22,840  40.3  800  8,000  27,950  121,250  22.3 
college degree +  46.7  4,000  1,500  16,560  54,850  53.3  1,700  9,700  74,300  195,910  34.2 
                    
by  income:                    
lt  $10,000  87.3  1,000 245  510  6,410  12.7  480 1,580  6,100  61,850  13.8 
$10,000-$24,999  60.0  1,700 500  1,000  9,975  40.0  510 3,300  10,150  5,010  29.4 
$2,5000-$49,999  58.1  2,900 870  3,300  17,350  41.9  700 5,300  25,360  81,860  41.2 
$50,000-$99,999  51.7  4,000 2,000  22,910  69,400  48.3  1,200 9,300  58,600  169,150  28.1 
$100,000 +  40.4  4,000  4,000  79,300  223,500  59.6  2,500  17,200  165,000  399,050  19.5 50 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 We use information from the 1983, 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001 waves of the SCF. For a more 
complete discussion of features of the SCF as well as findings from the 2001 wave, see Aizcorbe, 
Kennickell, and Moore (2003). 
2 For ease of comparison, all dollar figures are converted to 2001 prices using the urban 
consumers all items Consumer Price Index. 
3 The omitted dummy variable is some college but not a four-year degree. 
4 The probit regressions also include a number of other explanatory variables that have been 
found to be significant in explaining credit card ownership, including marital status, number of 
children, whether the household head is self-employed or not currently employed, whether the 
household can be considered “liquidity constrained” because it has been turned down for credit or 
discouraged from applying for credit, whether the household over the past year spent less than its 
income, and whether the household had a checking account.  
5 In comparison, the estimated probability that this same individual would have any type of credit 
card rises from .63 in 1983 to .78 in 2001.   
6 In estimating the probabilities of card ownership, income and financial assets were assigned 
using the median values for the age-education range under consideration.  For a typical less-than-
35 year old with high school education, the median income was slightly over $30,000 (in 2001 $) 
with about $1,900 in financial assets.  For the same aged household with a college degree, the 
median income is just under $45,000 and median financial assets were just under $10,000.  For a 
household aged 50-64 with a college education, median income was just under $82,000 and 
median financial assets were slightly over $111,000.  All representative households were assumed 
to be “savers,” all were assumed to have a checking account, and none were assumed to be 
liquidity constrained.   
7 In the 1992 SCF, the question was about debit card ownership. In subsequent surveys, the 
question was rephrased to elicit a response explicitly on debit card usage. Thus, the 1992 figure is 
an upper bound to actual debit card use in 1992. 
8 For observations from the wave of the 1992 SCF, the dependent variable is debit card ownership 
instead of debit card use as in the 1995-2001 waves.  However, the including the 1992 sample 
provides a useful base from which to measure the spread of debit card use, and size and 
significance of coefficients on the explanatory variables are little affected if the regression is run 
instead only on the 1995-2001 subset. 
9 In contrast, about two-thirds of all U.S. households had home equity, and slightly over half of 
households with incomes under $50,000. 
10 Information on new charges was not asked of households in 1983. We use instead a question 
that asked about frequency of use of the card in question. We consider households who had no 
balance on their bank-type card and answered that the card was used “hardly ever” or “never” to 
be non-active card users. 
11 As noted by Gross and Souleles (2002a, p. 151n) and others, SCF data are subject to the 
limitation that households substantially underreport their bankcard debt. As an example, Gross 
and Souleles compare the average credit card debt (including retail-store debt) across households 
with credit cards given by the 1995 SCF to that given by aggregate data on revolving consumer 
credit collected by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The figures are around 
$ 2,000 and $5,000, respectively. 
12 Since utilization rates are based on reported credit card balances, they are subject to the same 
underreporting that we noted in footnote 6 above for credit card balances. Gross and Souleles 
(2002a) tend to find greater utilization rates based on administrative account data than those 
reported here, but their unit is an account rather than a household, and they have less information 
on demographics and on the overall household portfolio. 51 
                                                                                                                                                   
13 Less than 1 percent of card holder households without a card balance were behind two months 
or more on any type of loan payment. 
14 This relationship between the size of the credit card balance to available liquid assets holds 
even accounting for an  understatement of credit card debt in the SCF as indicated in Gross and 
Souleles. Indeed, readily available resources to pay off the balance are somewhat understated, as 
the SCF does not collect data on cash held by respondents. 
15 Note that some holders classified as “unaware” under the stricter criterion may be actually 
facing very low (‘teaser’) rates. 
16 For example, Ausubel estimated that, while the ordinary pre-tax return on equity in banking for 
the 50 largest issuers of credit cards was on the order of 20 percent per year, these issuers earned 
annual returns of 60 to 100 percent or more on their credit card business during the period. 
17 Examples include costs of locating other providers and of filling in new applications, and the 
perception that credit ratings and credit limits are functions of the length of time during which a 
particular credit card account is held, but he doubts that they are sufficiently important by 
themselves. 
18 Although banks do not alter interest rates, they can be generous to credit-worthy customers by 
providing grace periods, small or no annual fees, and points or miles; and strict with bad 
customers by imposing heavy penalties on those who miss their payments or exceed their limits. 
19 As Brito and Hartley (1995) put it, ‘[t]he most desirable customers are those who borrow a 
substantial amount on their cards and yet remain well within their credit limits and therefore are 
unlikely to default’ (p. 409). 
20 Previous empirical studies of bankruptcy using household-level data include Moss and Johnson 
(1999), and Domowitz and Sartain (1999). The first uses data from the Survey of Consumer 
Finances, which does not include observations on bankruptcy filings. The second combines SCF 
data with a separate data set on a relatively limited set of bankruptcy petitions under Chapter 7 in 
the early 1980’s, and finds that households with more credit card debt were more likely to file for 
bankruptcy. 
21 The probability of an average credit card holder to declare bankruptcy rose by 1 percentage 
point, and that to declare delinquency by 3 percentage points over the period. 
22 Although income variables turn out to be significant in predicting bankruptcy, they may also be 
interpreted as reflecting unmeasured changes in wealth for the years in which the PSID did not 
collect wealth data. More direct measures of financial need in the data turn out to be insignificant 
or marginally significant, but of course this may be because better proxies for need are not 
available and not because need does not play a role. 
23 Quantitatively, their model predicts that an increase of $1,000 in households’ financial benefit 
from bankruptcy would result in a 7-percent increase in the number of bankruptcy filings. 
24 This is a random household telephone survey conducted monthly  by the Ohio State University 
Survey Research Center, and it includes variables unavailable in other surveys. The period is 
February 1998 through May 1999, with additional data from September 1999. 
25 It is obvious that debt levels would rise more in response to any given increase if the customer 
had requested it with a specific expenditure in mind than if the bank initiated it. 
26 Households exhibit such behavior when they are characterized by “prudence”, usually 
identified with a positive third derivative of the felicity function. 
27 The household has a finite lifetime of uncertain length, an effective size that varies over its life-
cycle, and a bequest motive. It is faced with non-diversifiable income risk and age-income profile 
determined by its education level and estimated from PSID data. 
28 This desired consumption level will not be the same in general as the level that would prevail in 
the absence of the problem of self-control. This is because the household bears costs in the effort 
to restrain the behavior of the shopper. 52 
                                                                                                                                                   
29 Reda (2003), quoted in Zinman (2004), reports that debit cards tend to be used for smaller 
transactions involving instantaneous consumption, while credit cards are used for larger 
transactions of more durable items. 
30 Haliassos and Reiter (2005) compare simulated costs of revolving credit card debt and of using 
a debit card to cope with a self-control problem. They find that, even if we abstract from bonuses 
and fraud protection offered by credit cards, the benefits from switching to debit cards are small 
for a household with a self-control problem. These can plausibly be eliminated by such additional 
benefits offered by credit cards and by any differential transaction fees or informational 
requirements in acquiring the newer instrument, debit cards. CFS Working Paper Series: 
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